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The New Governance and the
Challenge of Litigation Bylaws
Jill E. Fisch†
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance mechanisms designed to ensure
that managers act in shareholders’ interests have evolved
dramatically over the past 40 years.1 A variety of regulatory
and capital market developments have contributed to this
evolution.2 Law and economics scholars viewed the wave of
corporate takeovers of the 1980s as harnessing market discipline
to increase management accountability.3 When regulatory and
economic developments, as well as the adoption of issuer-specific
defensive measures such as the poison pill,4 reduced the incidence
of hostile takeovers, corporate governance adapted through
greater director independence and executive compensation plans
that tied compensation more closely to issuer performance.5 This
article refers to these developments as the “old governance.”
† Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I
am grateful for feedback provided by participants at the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty
workshop and the University of Pennsylvania Faculty Ad Hoc workshop and the
helpful comments offered by Robert Jackson and Charles Elson when this lecture was
delivered at Brooklyn Law School on October 8, 2015.
1 Ocasio and Joseph date the first use of the term “corporate governance” to
1972. See William Ocasio & John Joseph, Cultural Adaptation and Institutional
Change: The Evolution of Vocabularies of Corporate Governance, 1972–2003, 33
POETICS 163, 166 (2005); see also Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46 (Mike Wright
et al. eds., 2013) (describing developments in corporate governance from the 1970s to
the 1990s).
2 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (describing capital markets developments, including the
reconcentration of share ownership, as driving changes in corporate governance).
3 See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 118-19 (2008) (explaining that takeovers provide a market-based
system of disciplining underperforming managers).
4 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 875-78
(2002) (explaining how the development of the poison pill dramatically changed the
structure of the market for corporate control).
5 See id. at 872 (terming these developments “adaptive devices”).
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Shareholders have continued to experiment with
mechanisms to increase managerial accountability. Although
shareholders have in some cases sought to impose these
mechanisms by seeking regulatory changes,6 for the most part the
innovations take the form of private ordering—that is, the
adoption of issuer-specific rules that are contractual in nature (as
opposed to statutes, agency rules, or decisional law).7 These
governance innovations typically take the form of provisions in an
issuer’s charter and bylaws.8 For example, shareholders
responded to the poison pill by introducing bylaws seeking to limit
the board’s authority to adopt or maintain a pill.9 Shareholder-
adopted bylaw proposals have expanded to address a variety of
other governance issues.10
The evolution has not been one-dimensional. As
shareholders have sought to increase their role in corporate
decisionmaking, issuers have responded by adopting mechanisms
designed to constrain activist influence and, in particular, the
potential short-term bias of some activist investors.11 In some
cases, board-adopted bylaws respond directly to shareholder
efforts, such as when they impose procedures or conditions on the
exercise of new shareholder governance rights.12
This article uses the term “the new governance”13 to
describe the use of issuer-specific bylaws by both corporate
6 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a)(2) (2012)) (Dodd-Frank) (implementing governance reforms, including “say on
pay”); Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (adopting a federal proxy access rule).
7 See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80
FORDHAML.REV. 125, 127 n.12 (2011) (discussing various uses of the term private ordering).
8 Although governance innovations can be implemented in either the charter
or the bylaws, this article will focus on bylaw provisions because they can generally be
adopted unilaterally by either the board or the shareholders. See infra notes 106-07
(describing director and shareholder authority to amend the bylaws). Shareholder responses
can also take the form of a traditional contract. See, e.g., UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898
A.2d 344, 345-46 (Del. Ch. 2006) (describing contractual provision limiting the board’s
power to adopt a poison pill).
9 See infra note 55 (describing pill redemption bylaws).
10 See infra notes 70-102 (describing shareholder-adopted bylaws).
11 For an analysis of the potential short-term orientation of institutional investors,
see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the
Dueling IdeologicalMythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L.REV. 449 (2014).
12 See ISS Proxy Advisory Services, Allergan, Inc. Aug. 6, 2014, at 7-8
(describing the board’s unilateral adoption of bylaws limiting shareholder power, based
on shareholder-approved charter amendments, to act by written consent and to call a
special shareholder meeting).
13 I do not intend to connect the analysis in this article to the use of the term
“new governance” by scholars studying the relationship between institutional design
and effective regulation, although there are some potential parallels between that work
and the ideas discussed herein. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory
Governance, in THEOXFORDHANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 3 (David Levi-Four ed., 2012),
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boards and shareholders to structure governance rights.14 The
critical characteristic of the new governance is that it reflects a
structural approach to the balance of power between boards
and shareholders. Importantly, this structural approach has
been implemented through private ordering rather than
regulatory reform.15
The advantages to implementing governance reform
through private ordering include firm-specific tailoring of
corporate governance rather than a one-size-fits-all approach,
minimization of regulatory error, and the opportunity to overcome
political and other constraints on regulatory change.
Significantly, private-ordering governance innovations are
distinctive in that they evolve through an iterative process. The
new governance allows boards and shareholders each in turn to
innovate and respond to governance changes.
The dark side of private ordering is that the process by
which governance innovations are developed and adopted is
poorly understood. Self-interested managers may adopt bylaws
designed to insulate themselves from accountability to
shareholders or market discipline. Institutional shareholders may
propose reforms that are empirically untested or driven by
objectives other than maximizing firm value. Policy entrepreneurs
may advocate for changes for reasons that further their own
agendas rather than enhancing value.16 At the same time, market
discipline may be imperfect. Notably, commentators have
questioned the extent to which the market responds to governance
reforms through changes in stock price.17
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179160 [http://perma.cc/2R9F-S5RC] (describing new governance as
“a school of thought that focuses on the significance of institutional design and culture for
effective and legitimate regulation”).
14 To be fair, corporate governance does not reflect an abrupt shift between old and
new governance. Indeed, this article views shareholder efforts to address the adoption and
scope of the poison pill through bylaws that limit board authority as a transition to the
structural approach that characterizes the new governance.
15 See also Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access,
61 EMORY L.J. 435, 496-97 (2012) [hereinafter Fisch, Destructive Ambiguity]
(highlighting advantages of private ordering for developing procedures for shareholder
nomination of director candidates).
16 See Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 649, 651-56 (2016) (examining empirically the role of intermediaries in
governance innovation); Martin Lipton & Daniel Neff,Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project
Is Still Wrong (Nov. 30, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/30/harvards-
shareholder-rights-project-is-still-wrong/ [http://perma.cc/F5ES-WE3W] (describing efforts
by the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project to de-stagger corporate boards as “[a] small
but influential alliance of activist investor groups, academics and trade unions continues—
successfully it must be said—to seek to overhaul corporate governance in America to suit
their particular agendas and predilections”).
17 See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 16, at 657-58.
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These concerns raise the question of the extent to which
the new governance requires regulatory or judicial oversight.
Historically, Delaware has deferred to market forces to discipline
governance innovation.18 If anything, the case for deferring to
market forces has increased with capital market developments
such as the rise of institutional voting, the influence of the
proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),
and the ability of shareholders to initiate bylaw changes through
the shareholder proposal process of Rule 14a-8.19 In keeping with
this approach, Delaware has taken a largely hands-off approach to
the new governance, although the courts have invalidated some
shareholder innovations on the grounds that they unduly interfere
with board authority and have policed board innovations that are
extreme or adopted for an improper purpose.20
In 2015, however, the Delaware legislature took the
unusual step of amending the state’s corporation statute to
impose limits on the new governance with respect to so-called
litigation bylaws.21 The legislative response was unusual
because it interposed the legislature into a market process that was
already responding to the introduction of litigation bylaws.22 The
legislative response involved a rare package of mandatory
provisions that individual issuers could not change.23 Notably,
the 2015 legislation displaced the traditional Delaware approach
of allowing courts to police the adoption and use of litigation
bylaws in the same way that they had policed other governance
innovations such as the poison pill.
Part I of this article briefly sketches the background of
corporate governance evolution. In Part II, the article introduces
18 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 872. The seeming exception is the poison
pill. Delaware courts developed an elaborate jurisprudence for reviewing board
adoption and use of a pill. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del.
Ch. 1985) (evaluating board authority to adopt a poison pill); Paramount Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (applying analysis from Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), to analyze board’s decision to maintain a
poison pill to block a hostile transaction). In the end, however, the legal standard
rarely involved judicial interference, and market forces likely proved far more
significant in determining the extent to which a board could wield a pill to defend
against a takeover attempt. See Air Prods. & Chems, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48,
54-55 (Del. Ch. 2011).
19 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections
and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 655-67 (2008-2009) (describing
market and regulatory developments that have increased the importance of
shareholder voting).
20 See infra notes 160-73.
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (2015) (2015 legislation).
22 See, e.g., ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559 (Del.
2014) (upholding facial validity of fee-shifting bylaw but warning that context might
limit its application).
23 See infra notes 216-18 (describing the legislation in detail).
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the new governance and explains how both shareholders and
issuer boards have innovated through the adoption of
governance bylaws. Part III describes the legal standards that
courts have applied in evaluating the validity of governance
bylaws and the rationale for this approach. In Part IV, the
article considers the specific case of litigation bylaws. The
article asks whether the 2015 legislation that restricted the
scope of litigation bylaws can be justified in light of Delaware’s
traditional deference to the courts and the market. Toward
that end, the article explores the extent to which litigation
bylaws should be viewed as conceptually distinct from other
new governance provisions.
The article concludes that, whether or not the legislature’s
actions were appropriate, they should be understood as context-
specific. Litigation bylaws reflect an issuer’s attempt partially to
opt out of the package of Delaware law to which it has submitted
by choosing to incorporate in Delaware. As a result, the
legislature’s response can be viewed as imposing a requirement
that corporations that seek to avail themselves of Delaware law
submit to the full package of Delaware corporate law—a package
that includes both statutory provisions and oversight by the
Delaware courts. In that light, the legislation need not signal an
intention to subject the new governance to greater oversight.
I. BACKGROUND
In the United States, the focus on corporate governance
began in the 1970s.24 Brian Cheffins traces the origins of
corporate governance to an effort by the SEC to address
management accountability as part of the agency’s regulatory
agenda—specifically, the SEC’s attempt to reduce payments by
U.S. corporations of overseas bribes.25 The foreign corrupt
payments scandal26 and the congressional response through the
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 197727
legitimized the SEC’s involvement in the effort to reduce public
companies’ managerial agency costs.
24 Cheffins, supra note 1, at 46.
25 Id. at 2.
26 See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 929, 932 (2012) (describing the foreign corrupt payments problem).
27 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat.
1494, 1496, amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415, and by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
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The initial concern over corrupt foreign payments
extended to a broader focus on managerial agency costs. In the
1970s and 1980s, the market for corporate control began to
function as a mechanism for addressing these agency costs.28
The takeover market enabled strategic investors to overcome
collective action limitations on shareholder power by
purchasing control and using that control to replace management
and adopt other governance changes.29 Corporate takeovers were
highly controversial, however,30 and corporate America urged
policymakers to take action to defend incumbent management
against the much-maligned corporate “raiders.”31 Both states and
the federal government took some initial steps in this
direction—the states through the adoption of antitakeover
statutes,32 and the federal government through the passage of
the Williams Act.33
The demand for regulatory interference with takeovers
was reduced by the invention (and the Delaware courts’
acceptance) of the poison pill. The poison pill transformed the
market for corporate control without the need for broad-based
legislation.34 Poison pills enabled corporate boards to exert
greater power over the market for corporate control. At the
same time, the pill placed heightened responsibility on boards
to exercise that power appropriately. Together with the
staggered board, the pill dramatically reduced an issuer’s
vulnerability to a hostile tender offer.35
28 See Steven N. Kaplan, The Evolution of U.S. Corporate Governance: We Are
All Henry Kravis Now, 7 U. OF CHI. J. PRIVATE EQUITY 5-6 (1997) (“The takeover wave
of the 1980s appears to have been a capital market response to corporate governance
deficiencies.”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 171-74 (1991) (discussing the importance of tender
offers and advocating the prohibition of target resistance for controlling agency costs).
29 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:
A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145, 1152 (1994) (describing and challenging the claim by law and economics
scholars that “the hostile takeover performs a desirable disciplinary function by
replacing inefficient management”).
30 See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and
Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1425, 1429 (1991) (describing the debate over hostile takeovers).
31 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for
Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 868 n.41 (1993) (citing
testimony by corporate issuers).
32 See, e.g., Matheson & Olson, supra note 30 (describing state antitakeover
statutes).
33 Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l-78n (1988)); see Matheson & Olson, supra note 30, at 1435-37
(describing the adoption of the Williams Act).
34 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4.
35 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891 (2002)
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Corporate governance adapted to the pill.36 The
percentage of outside directors on corporate boards increased,
as did the degree to which these directors were independent of
management.37 Executive compensation structures also evolved,
shifting to forms of payment that provided high-powered
management incentives, including the incentive for management
to agree to the terms of an attractive takeover bid.38 In part
because of this adaptive process, the takeover era set into
motion an increased focus on management accountability to
shareholders. The defense of takeovers as a mechanism for
reducing managerial agency costs thus translated into a broader
agenda for governance reform.
The rise of the institutional investor created a means of
pursuing that agenda. During this same time period, the
ownership of the U.S. public corporation was shifting from the
Berle and Means model of dispersed ownership to a structure
in which institutional ownership began to dominate.39 This
trend was greatest among the largest issuers; by the 2000s,
institutional investors owned more than 70% of the equity in the
1,000 largest U.S. corporations.40 The new institutional investors
were concerned about the governance of their portfolio companies.
Public pension fund CalPERS led the way with its strategy of
identifying underperforming companies and publicly targeting
them for governance reform.41
Structural limitations and new agency problems, however,
limited the role that these institutional investors were willing to
play in corporate governance.42 In particular, most institutional
investors’ business models did not provide suitable incentives for
portfolio managers to exercise their governance rights
(finding that an effective staggered board nearly doubles the likelihood that a target
company will remain independent).
36 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 881-85.
37 Id.; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465,
1472-73 (2007) (describing the rise of independent directors and director independence).
38 Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 884.
39 See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962-63 (2010) (describing increase in institutional ownership
and explaining it, in part, by the increased use, by retail investors, of institutional
intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension funds); see also Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 2, at 886 (terming this a “reconcentration of ownership”).
40 Fisch, supra note 39, at 1963.
41 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence
on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV.
315, 315-17 (2008) (describing CalPERS’s activist strategy as a model for other institutions);
Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS,
51 J. FIN. 227, 251 (1996) (empirically analyzing the CalPERS effect).
42 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 2, at 889-91.
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actively.43 Gilson and Gordon argue that the inability of this
pool of institutional money to be proactive created a “governance
gap,” which, in turn, created a market opportunity.44 The
specialized investor to exploit this market opportunity was the
hedge fund. Gilson and Gordon portray the modern hedge fund
as a governance arbitrageur that can harness institutional
power to support governance reform.45
That activist hedge funds have successfully mobilized
the reconcentrated stakes of other more passive institutional
investors is clear. Moreover, this mobilization empowered even
passive institutions. Issuers must be responsive to the needs
and demands of passive institutions because of the potential
importance of those institutions in providing voting support for
an activist campaign.46 This has led to an increasing emphasis
in corporate governance on issuer responsiveness to
shareholder interests.
The appropriate level of such responsiveness from the
perspective of maximizing firm or societal value is a difficult
normative question that is beyond the scope of this article.47 Some
commentators have convincingly argued that the market has
been too responsive to shareholder pressure and that the
shareholder empowerment strategy “reached the outer limits of
its effectiveness for the time being.”48 Whatever the appropriate
level, it is clear that, in the United States, shareholders are more
active and effective in corporate governance than ever before.
II. GOVERNANCE INNOVATIONS
A. The New Governance from the Shareholder’s Perspective
Initial shareholder efforts at corporate governance focused
on reducing managerial agency costs through two mechanisms.
One was the increased use of a monitoring board comprised
43 See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55
OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1023-24 (1994) (providing a general formula that describes the
collective action problem and explaining why, because of competition, the benefits to
traditional institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds from
activism are unlikely to outweigh the costs).
44 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 2, at 896.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 For a summary of the debate, see Jennifer G. Hill, The Rising Tension
Between Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law World, 18 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 344 (2010).
48 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 728 (2010).
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primarily of independent directors.49 The second was a
refinement of executive compensation practices designed to
create better managerial incentives by aligning the interests of
executives with those of shareholders.50 Delaware law mandates
that shareholder governance initiatives be indirect.51 Under
Delaware law, shareholders lack the authority to manage the
corporation; hence, their efforts must be directed to increasing the
accountability of those who possess that authority—officers and
the board of directors.52
In their initial form, both board and compensation
reforms were implemented through private ordering.53 For
both, however, issuer-specific developments were supplemented
by regulatory intervention. In the case of board reform, the self-
regulatory organizations, at the behest of the SEC, mandated
increased board independence by amending their listing
requirements. With respect to compensation, shareholder
efforts to reform the structure of executive compensation were
assisted by regulatory measures such as the adoption of
Internal Revenue Code section 162(m), which provided for more
favorable tax treatment of performance-based executive
compensation. Similarly, Congress adopted both increased
disclosure requirements and an advisory shareholder vote on
executive compensation as part of Dodd-Frank.54
Shareholders also sought to use private ordering to limit
directly a board’s ability to resist a takeover attempt.
49 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 37, at 1514-20; Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards
Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 267 (1997) (noting that commentators have
generally accepted the monitoring function of the board as displacing its role in
managing the corporation).
50 See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 884.
51 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014) (giving boards of directors the
authority to manage the corporation); see also Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith,
Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers,
80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 322 (2001) (“In the scheme of corporate governance the role of
shareholders has been purposefully indirect. Shareholders’ direct authority is limited.”
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 975 P.2d 907, 911
(Okla. 1999))).
52 See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch.
1988) (“Generally, shareholders have only two protections against perceived inadequate
business performance. They may sell their stock (which, if done in sufficient numbers, may
so affect security prices as to create an incentive for altered managerial performance),
or they may vote to replace incumbent board members.”).
53 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 37, at 1447-48 (recounting development of the
focus on director independence); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The
Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 310-12
(2009) (describing evolution of procedural mechanisms to address compensation, such
as compensation committees).
54 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 972, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78n-2 (2012)).
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Specifically, in the mid-1990s, some institutional investors
proposed bylaws that attempted to restrict the board’s adoption
or use of a poison pill.55 These provisions reflected an
unprecedented effort by shareholders to use their statutory
authority to adopt bylaws as a means of limiting board authority.56
As such, they presented a novel tension between board and
shareholder power.57 Although an Oklahoma court upheld the
validity of a pill redemption bylaw in 1999,58 most commentators
argued that Delaware courts would invalidate such a bylaw as
impermissibly interfering with the board’s managerial authority
under Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) 141(a).59
Delaware courts did not rule on the validity of so-called
first generation pill redemption bylaws.60 Investors modified
their approach, however, to address concerns over the validity of
such a bylaw. For example, Harvard Law Professor Lucian
Bebchuk explored an alternative approach at Computer
Associates. The Bebchuk bylaw, which he introduced through a
shareholder proposal, would have required a board vote to
adopt or extend a poison pill to be unanimous.61 Although
Bebchuk sought to have a court determine the validity of the
provision, the Delaware court refused to do so, holding that the
issue was not ripe.62 The proposal was included in Computer
Associates’ proxy materials but was not approved by the
55 Arbitrageur Guy Wyser-Pratte is credited with the introduction of the first
such bylaw and introduced proposals for pill-redemption bylaws successfully in several
cases in which he sought to persuade the target company boards to agree to an
acquisition. See Kate Margolis, Comment, Binding Shareholder Bylaw Amendments:
An Antidote for the Poison Pill?, 67 MISS. L.J. 817, 831 (1998); see also Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the
Street?, 73 TULANE L. REV. 409, 421 (1998) [hereinafter Hamermesh, Corporate
Democracy] (describing history of the AFL-CIO’s introduction of a pill-redemption
bylaw at Fleming Companies).
56 See Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy, supra note 55, at 426-27 (noting
that corporate bylaws had previously received little attention).
57 See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 7, at 140-43 (summarizing this debate).
58 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 975 P.2d 907,
908 (Okla. 1999).
59 See, e.g., Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy, supra note 55, at 428-33;
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of
Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 613-16 (1997); Brett H.
McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 205 (2005).
60 John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation By-Laws: Post-
Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1329 (2001) (“[N]o Delaware court has
addressed the legality of first generation shareholder bylaws.”).
61 The Bebchuk Bylaw: Devilish . . . but Brilliant, 6 M&A J. 1 (2006)
[hereinafter Bebchuk Bylaw].
62 Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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shareholders, so its validity under Delaware law was never
tested.63
Subsequently, Professor Bebchuk adopted a different
strategy to reduce a board’s ability to resist a hostile takeover,
mounting a broad-based campaign to eliminate classified
boards of directors.64 Over the course of a few years, Bebchuk
successfully persuaded many institutional investors to pressure
issuers to declassify their boards. This shift was facilitated by
the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project (SRP), a clinical
program at Harvard Law School, directed by Professor
Bebchuk.65 The SRP mounted a campaign from 2012 to 2014 to
eliminate staggered boards.66 The strategy was very successful;
as of 2014, “[a]lmost 90 percent of S&P 500 companies (and
almost 60 percent of Russell 3000 companies) ha[d] annually
elected boards.”67 According to a recent posting on the SRP site,
the program is no longer operating.68
Shareholders’ mixed success at using private ordering to
address the poison pill did not dissuade them from continuing
to test the limits of their authority to restructure corporate
decisionmaking through bylaw provisions. Instead of focusing
on poison pills, shareholders began to introduce issuer-specific
bylaws aimed more generally at the structure and composition
of the board of directors and at the election process itself.
The demand for greater shareholder input into the
selection of directors was heightened by the corporate
governance scandals of the late 1990s that, in many cases,
revealed substantial deficiencies at the board level. The
massive fraud at Enron, for example, was attributed in part to
the failure of its board to exercise sufficient oversight.69 In
63 Matthew F. Sullivan, Shareholder Bylaw Proposals, Delaware
Certification, and the SEC After CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 87 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 193, 205 n.59 (2010).
64 A classified board enhances the effectiveness of a pill because it extends
the procedures for replacing a majority of the board, in order to redeem the pill, for
more than one election contest. See Bebchuk Bylaw, supra note 61, at 1-4.
65 For a description of the SRP, see Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A.
Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against
Classified Boards of Directors 20-21 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper
No. 199, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2536586 [http://perma.cc/N3J3-8VP5].
66 Id.
67 Marc S. Gerber, “US Corporate Governance: Boards of Directors Face
Increased Scrutiny,” SKADDEN (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/insights/us-corporate-
governance-boards-directors-face-increased-scrutiny [http://perma.cc/K2NM-6THZ].
68 See Shareholder Rights Project, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.srp.law.
harvard.edu/companies-voting-on-proposals.shtml [http://perma.cc/X35Z-JZQ3] (last visited
June 17, 2016) (“With work on the declassification project completed last summer, the
clinic has not been operating during the current academic year.”).
69 See, e.g., WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 24
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addition, there were reasons to believe courts might be more
receptive to shareholder efforts focused on the election process.
For example, the Delaware Chancery Court explained in Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. that the “question who should
constitute the board of directors” was not one that could be “left
to the agent’s business judgment.”70
Shareholder efforts at restructuring the election process
through bylaw amendments took several forms. One approach
was to introduce a bylaw giving shareholders the right to
nominate director candidates for inclusion on the issuer’s proxy
statement. This power, which shareholders had sought since the
1940s, came to be known as proxy access.71 Proxy access faced an
obstacle, however: SEC opposition to granting shareholders broad
access to the issuer’s proxy statement. First, the SEC decided that
proxy access proposals were not a proper subject for shareholder
proposals under Rule 14a-8.72 When a federal court disagreed,73
the SEC amended the shareholder proposal rule to exclude proxy
access proposals explicitly.74
Eventually, the SEC changed its position and,
responding to enabling legislation in Dodd-Frank, adopted a
federal proxy access rule, Rule 14a-11.75 The rule, which
implemented a mandatory standard by which shareholders
could access the issuer’s proxy statement for the purpose of
nominating director candidates, was highly controversial.76
Business interests promptly filed suit challenging the rule and,
(2002) (concluding that the Enron board failed in its oversight duties and that appropriate
board monitoring “could and should have been prevented or detected at an earlier time had
the Board been more aggressive and vigilant”). Indeed, Enron’s outside directors settled
claims of wrongdoing with the unusual agreement personally to pay money damages. See
Why Directors Pay—The Latest Wrinkle in the Corporate Governance Movement,
THOMPSON HINE (Jan. 1, 2005), http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/why-
directors-pay---the-latest-wrinkle-in-the-corporate-governance-movement [http://perma.cc/
RJB7-2QSK] (reporting that the Enron directors agreed to pay $13 million of their own
money to settle investor lawsuits).
70 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988).
71 See generally Fisch, Destructive Ambiguity, supra note 15 (describing
history of proxy access).
72 See AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the
SEC’s position that AIG could properly exclude AFSCME’s proxy access proposal as not
within the scope of Rule 14a-8).
73 Id.
74 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
75 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No.
33-9136, Exchange Act Release No. 33-62,764, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677-93 (Sept. 16,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
76 See Fisch, Destructive Ambiguity, supra note 15, at 441 (describing
business interests’ opposition to Rule 14a-11).
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in 2011, the D.C. Circuit invalidated it.77 The litigation did not,
however, disturb the SEC’s amendment to Rule 14a-8, which
had reversed its 2007 rulemaking78 and opened the door for
investors to use shareholder proposals to introduce proxy
access bylaws.79
The SEC’s original position opposing proxy access
shareholder proposals and the adoption and invalidation of
Rule 14a-11 delayed shareholder efforts to implement proxy
access through private ordering. Subsequently, however,
investors renewed their focus on proxy access. In November 2014,
the Office of the New York City Comptroller launched its
“Boardroom Accountability Project” in which it introduced proxy
access shareholder proposals at 75 issuers during the 2014-2015
proxy season.80 The proposals received widespread support. Of the
40 that were voted on during the first half of 2015, 64% received
majority shareholder support.81 In addition, several issuers
agreed to implement proxy access voluntarily, either in
response to the proposals or independently.82 Reports indicate
that “[p]roxy access bylaws are proliferating.”83
Another initiative designed to increase shareholder
power over the election of directors is majority voting. Although
directors have traditionally been elected under a plurality
voting standard, starting in 2005, shareholders began to
77 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
78 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
79 See Fisch, Destructive Ambiguity, supra note 15, at 450-52 (explaining the
effect of the amendment to Rule 14a-8 and its effectiveness as of September 20, 2011).
80 Boardroom Accountability Project, N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, http://comptroller.
nyc.gov/boardroom-accountability/ [http://perma.cc/8824-DZE7] (last visited June 17,
2016). Other shareholders also submitted proxy access proposals. See Elizabeth Ising,
Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2015 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM
ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (July 17, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/17/
shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2015-proxy-season/ [http://perma.cc/JPJ
7-TJZY] (reporting 108 proxy access proposals submitted during 2015 proxy season).
81 PROXY PULSE, 2015 PROXY MID-SEASON REVIEW (2d ed. 2015),
http://media.broadridge.com/documents/ProxyPulse-Mid-Season-Second-Edition-2015.p
df?id=00203PPRUSA15JUNLPG02PPR&so=ms&po=bt&ct=cd&ot=wp&mt=jn&yr=15&
rg=us [http://perma.cc/XU3J-VDFC].
82 Nikita Stewart, City Comptroller Reaches Deals with 5 Companies on Giving
Shareholders Say on Directors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/11/nyregion/city-comptroller-reaches-deals-with-5-companies-on-giving-sharehold
ers-say-on-directors.html [http://perma.cc/6UGD-VK7Q] (reporting that five issuers had
reached agreements with New York City to adopt proxy access and that three others
decided to institute proxy access without having received a proposal to do so).
83 Nicolas Grabar & Leah LaPorte Malone, Getting Ready for Proxy Access,
CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2015/10/getting-
ready-for-proxy-access/ [http://perma.cc/H64N-LL3A].
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advocate for a change in the voting standard.84 Delaware law
explicitly allows shareholders to adopt majority voting through
a bylaw provision,85 and in 2006, the legislature amended the
statute to prevent boards from amending or repealing a
shareholder-adopted majority voting bylaw.86 To date, the effort
to persuade issuers to switch to majority voting has been very
successful. Although only 9% of S&P 100 companies used
majority voting as recently as 2005, more than 90% of S&P 500
companies now use some form of majority voting.87
One of the substantial limits on shareholder power is
that corporate statutes vest the authority to call a shareholder
meeting in the board of directors.88 Delaware law, however,
authorizes the shareholders to adopt a bylaw that empowers
them to call a special meeting, giving the shareholders
increased control over the governance agenda.89 Provisions
giving shareholders the power to call a special meeting have
been among the most popular shareholder proposals.90 Their
proliferation has led many issuers to adopt special meeting
provisions voluntarily, although in some cases, issuers have
implemented a provision that required a higher threshold than
that requested by the shareholders.91
84 See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does
Majority Voting Increase Board Accountability?, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); see
also David C. McBride & Rolin P. Bissell, Delaware’s Flexible Approach to Majority
Voting for Directors, 10 WALL ST. LAW., June 2006, at 1 (describing move to adopt
majority voting policies and bylaws).
85 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2015).
86 The amendment added language providing that shareholder bylaws that
specify “the votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be
further amended or repealed by the board of directors.” Id.; see McBride & Bissell,
supra note 83, at 2 (explaining proposed statutory amendment and its purpose).
87 Choi, Majority Voting, supra note 84. Some commentators have argued
that the structure of a majority voting bylaw is limited by Delaware law. See, e.g.,
Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker, The Nuts and Bolts of Majority Voting,
MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.mnat.com/
files/113.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4Q3-R4HF].
88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2009).
89 J. Robert Brown Jr., Delaware Law and the Right of Shareholders to Call
Special Meetings, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Aug. 13, 2014, 6:01 AM),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/delaware-law-and-the-right-of-shareholders-
to-call-special-m.html [http://perma.cc/4345-M62Z].
90 See Ning Chiu & Richard J. Sandler, Spotlight on Shareholder Proposals:
Special Meetings, DAVIS POLK (July 19, 2011), http://www.briefinggovernance.com/2011
/07/spotlight-on-shareholder-proposals-independent-chairs/ [http://perma.cc/8YRR-ZL65]
(describing expansion of special meeting rights as a response to “targeted activism”); see
also Ising, supra note 80 (describing shareholder proposals regarding special meetings as
receiving “high shareholder support”).
91 See 2014 Proxy Season Review, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 11 (June 25, 2014).
Issuers have also introduced proposals with higher thresholds in an effort to block
shareholders from voting on a shareholder special meeting proposal. See id. As of June
2014, more than 60% of S&P 500 companies had some type of provision allowing
shareholders to call a special meeting, although the required threshold for making such
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Shareholders have also focused on director qualifications
and incentives. They have introduced proposals to impose
requirements of particular expertise or experience on director
candidates,92 to require greater director independence,93 to
establish a mandatory retirement age,94 to limit director tenure,95
and to increase director diversity.96 Most state statutes expressly
authorize a corporation to impose certain qualifications on
director candidates.97 For example, the Delaware statute explicitly
provides that the charter or bylaws “may prescribe other
qualifications for directors.”98 Commentary suggests that
permissible qualifications might include age and length of service.99
The broader scope of permissible qualification requirements is
unclear. Although the SEC has provided no-action guidance on
the validity of various qualification requirements in the context
a request varies. Id. at 11. The SEC recently issued guidance indicating that it will no
longer permit issuers to use this approach to exclude a shareholder proposal. See Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 14H (CF): Shareholder Proposals, SEC (Oct. 22, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/islb14h.htm [http://perma.cc/Y6LS-38UR].
92 One popular example is shareholder proposals seeking to have companies in
industries such as oil and gas or mining have a director with environmental expertise.
See Shareholders Press Boards on Social and Environmental Risks, ERNST & YOUNG,
http://www.ey.com/US/en/Services/Specialty-Services/Climate-Change-and-Sustainability
-Services/Shareholders-press-boards-on-social-and-environmental-risks---Take-action
[http://perma.cc/SN6H-GWTQ] (last visited June 17, 2016).
93 See, e.g., Intergraph Corp., 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 362 (Mar. 2, 1995)
(describing shareholder proposal to adopt a bylaw requirement that the board have a
majority of independent directors).
94 See Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy, supra note 55, at 482 n.312 (1998)
(describing several shareholder bylaw proposals that would have mandated director
retirement at age 70).
95 ISS has highlighted director tenure as a concern, although it has not yet
added the topic to its voting guidelines. Gerber, supra note 67.
96 CalSTRS has filed 35 proposals asking for action on board diversity.
Gretchen Morgenson, Not Walking the Walk on Board Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (May 31,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/business/not-walking-the-walk-on-board-div
ersity.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/D5NJ-BUG5]. Trillium filed 4 proposals in 2014
seeking board diversity. Trillium Files Four Board Diversity Shareholder Proposals for
2015, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT. (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.trilliuminvest.com/14405/
[http://perma.cc/DZF6-EL8S]. A Price Waterhouse Survey in 2014 found that nine of
ten investors believe that boards “should be revisiting their director diversity policies.”
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INVESTORPERSPECTIVES: HOW INVESTORSARESHAPINGBOARDS
TODAY . . . AND INTO THE FUTURE 6 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-
center/publications/assets/pwc-investor-survey-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/LC3K-L43Q].
97 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“The articles
of incorporation or bylaws may prescribe qualifications for directors.”); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 47-1A-802 (2016) (“The articles of incorporation or bylaws may prescribe
qualifications for directors.”).
98 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)-(b) (2014).
99 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L.
117, 156 n.182 (2014) (“Examples of qualifications that may be permissible under
section 8.02 are eligibility requirements based on residence, shareholdings, age, length
of service, experience, expertise and professional licenses or certifications.”) (citing
Corporate Laws Committee, ABA Section of Business Law, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments to Section 8.02 Relating to Qualifications for
Directors and Nominees for Directors, 68 BUS. LAW. 781, 782 (2013)).
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of Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals,100 courts have not ruled on
the validity of the proposed bylaws.101
In addition, many shareholders support bylaws
mandating the separation of the positions of chairman of the
board and CEO.102 Bank of America recently responded to
shareholder criticism of its decision to recombine the Chair and
CEO positions and to give both titles to CEO Brian Moynihan
by allowing shareholders to vote on a bylaw authorizing the
combined role.103 On September 22, 2015, shareholders approved
the bylaw in a closely watched decision that many viewed as
having important implications for the role of shareholders in
determining a corporation’s leadership structure.104
Finally, a few activists have developed compensation
schemes designed to increase the incentives for activist-
nominated director candidates to pursue structural changes or
otherwise increase shareholder value if elected. These so-called
golden leash compensation arrangements were used in several
activist campaigns in 2013 and appeared to decline in popularity
after they generated negative publicity and attempts by some
issuers to ban them through restrictive bylaws.105 Recently,
however, the golden leash has made a comeback in at least two
activist contests,106 and the first sitting directors subject to a golden
leash joined the board of Dow Chemical in November 2014.107
100 See, e.g., Monsanto Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 5433185 (Nov. 7,
2008) (endorsing the company’s Delaware counsel’s position that the qualification
appears to be unreasonable under state law).
101 Coates, supra note 60, at 482-83.
102 See Charles A. Tribbett, III, Splitting the CEO and Chairman Roles—Yes or
No?, RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCS. (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.russellreynolds.com/
newsroom/splitting-the-ceo-and-chairman-roles-yes-or-no [http://perma.cc/8UMJ-39R3]
(reporting that the calls for separation are growing but that the actual voting results on
such proposals are mixed).
103 Barry B. Burr, Florida SBA to Engage Bank of America on Separating
CEO, Chairman Roles, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Sept. 1, 2015, 4:26 PM),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20150901/ONLINE/150909981/florida-sba-to-engage-bank-
of-america-on-separating-ceo-chairman-roles [http://perma.cc/674G-YYBH].
104 See, e.g., Barry B. Burr, Bank of America Shareholders Vote in Favor of
Combining CEO, Chairman Roles, PENSIONS& INVESTMENTS (Sept. 22, 2015, 10:23 AM),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20150922/ONLINE/150929971/bank-of-america-sharehol
ders-vote-in-favor-of-combining-ceo-chairman-roles [http://perma.cc/LHW4-E5BF]; Michael
Corkery, Victory for the Chief and the Board at Bank of America over a Dual Role, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/deal
book/bank-of-america-shareholders-allow-ceo-to-keep-chairmans-role.html [http://perma.
cc/M5K6-QDDU].
105 See Cain et al., supra note 16, at 652-53.
106 See Shane C. D’Souza & Deandra Schubert, “Golden Leashes” Are Back: Will
Shareholder Activists Win This Round?, CANADIAN M&A PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.canadianmergersacquisitions.com/2014/11/18/golden-leashes-are-back-will-sh
areholder-activists-win-this-round/ [http://perma.cc/47K4-BAC8].
107 The directors were seated pursuant to a settlement between Dow and a
shareholder activist. David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin, Dow Chemical, Loeb Settle Board
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B. The Boards Fight Back
Most commentators agree that the foregoing developments
led issuers to become more responsive to shareholder interests.
Many issuers responded, however, to activist efforts to increase
shareholder power and board accountability by attempting to
limit the exercise of shareholder power and to maintain director
primacy over issues such as the composition and structure of
the board of directors. One tool that boards can use to limit the
exercise of shareholder power is the bylaw.
In most states, directors and shareholders share the
authority to amend the corporate bylaws,108 but each can act
unilaterally to do so.109 The consequence is that the board can
make governance changes without shareholder approval. One
commentator explained that “these types of bylaws intended to
inhibit shareholder actions are all the rage in corporate
America.”110 Board efforts to limit shareholder control of the board
can range from bylaws that impose substantive requirements on
directors to those that institute procedural obstacles such as
disclosure requirements and advance notice bylaws.
Dispute, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-chemical-
third-point-settle-board-dispute-1416578708 [http://perma.cc/N4QU-NR5L]. They were
subsequently elected at the next annual meeting. Press Release, Dow Chem. Co., Dow
Announces Results from Annual Stockholder Meeting (May 14, 2015),
http://www.dow.com/news/press-releases/dow%20announces%20results%20from%20ann
ual%20stockholder%20meeting%20may%202015 [http://perma.cc/QDV5-XENP].
108 In Delaware, the charter must affirmatively grant the board the power to
amend the bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2015). Delaware corporate
charters are virtually universal in granting boards this power. J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting
Bylaws), 92 DEN. U. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 51 (2015), http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/
f/276323/26185020/1430369648393/The_Future_Direction_of_Delaware_Law_FINAL.p
df?token=RIc3XD44aEmVE5%2BTL1x7AvvQ3M0%3D [http://perma.cc/JA3M-6X6D].
Moreover, where the board has the power to amend the bylaws, the statute does not limit
the board’s power to amend a shareholder-adopted bylaw. See Gen. DataComm Indus.,
Inc. v. Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.2, 822 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[In Delaware,] . . . the
corporation statutes allow the board of directors to amend the by-laws if the certificate or
articles of incorporation so provide and place no express limits on the application of such
director amendment authority to stockholder-adopted by-laws.”). The Model Business
Corporation Act affirmatively grants the board the power to amend the bylaws unless the
charter gives the shareholders the exclusive right to do so. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 10.20(b) (AM. BARASS’N 2002).
109 In contrast, the Oklahoma legislature amended its corporation law after
International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 975 P.2d
907, 911 (Okla. 1999), to provide that shareholders lack the power to amend the bylaws
unless such power is affirmatively conferred by the charter. See 18 OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 1013 (2015).
110 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Allergan-Valeant Fight Holds Lessons for All
Corporate Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 18, 2014, 4:05 PM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2014/09/18/allergan-valeant-fight-holds-lessons-for-all-corporate-sharehol
ders/ [http://perma.cc/A9YF-JHCG].
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One of the most frequently adopted bylaws that limits
shareholders’ ability to exercise their rights through the
imposition of procedural restrictions is the advance notice
bylaw.111 An advance notice bylaw typically provides a
shareholder with a window to submit notice to the corporate
secretary of proposed actions to be taken at the next annual
meeting, such as director nominations or shareholder proposals.
Delaware courts have observed that “[a]dvance notice
requirements are ‘commonplace’ and ‘are often construed and
frequently upheld as valid by Delaware courts.’”112
Advance notice provisions can apply not merely to
shareholder actions at the annual meeting but also to
shareholder power to call a special meeting. In Mentor Graphics
v. Quickturn, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld a bylaw that
allowed a delay of 90–100 days between a shareholder’s request
for an annual meeting and the holding of a meeting, concluding
that such a delay, which coincided with the issuer’s advance
notice bylaw, was similarly permissible.113 The court held that
the delay was reasonable in that it ensured that the
shareholders would have sufficient time to inform themselves
before the vote.
Delaware courts have been less tolerant of board-
adopted bylaws that limit the ability of shareholders to act
through written consent—a power that is explicitly conferred
upon shareholders by statute unless the charter otherwise
provides.114 In Datapoint v. Plaza Securities, the Chancery
Court struck down a board-adopted bylaw that provided for a
60-day delay before the effectiveness of an action taken by
shareholder written consent.115 The court held that such a
provision impermissibly interfered with the shareholders’ right
to action by written consent. The Datapoint court noted,
however, that a bylaw establishing a ministerial review of the
validity of the consents would be valid.116 Subsequently, the
Delaware Supreme Court struck down a similar bylaw that
established a 20-day review period, finding that such a delay
111 See Hamermesh, Director Nominations, supra note 99, at 136 (explaining
that advance notice bylaws have “become standard in U.S. public companies”).
112 Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., No. 6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *4 (Del.
Ch. June 3, 2011) (quoting Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master
Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 238-39 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
113 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., 728 A.2d 25, 39 (Del. Ch. 1998).
114 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (2014).
115 Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 1985).
116 Id. at 1036.
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was “so pervasive as to intrude upon fundamental stockholder
rights guaranteed by statute.”117
Boards have expanded the use of advance notice bylaws
such that they now require not merely notice but the disclosure
of increasingly detailed information about the nominees, the
nominating shareholder, or both. As Larry Hamermesh notes,
these requirements have “not yet attracted specific judicial
attention.”118 Nonetheless, disclosure requirements can burden
shareholder efforts to nominate competing directors and create
additional litigation risk.
The recent Allergan case provided an extreme example
of board-adopted bylaws limiting the exercise of shareholder
governance rights.119 At the 2013 annual meeting, the
shareholders of Allergan approved a charter amendment
authorizing the holders of 25% of the company’s stock to call a
special meeting. The Allergan board introduced the charter
amendment after a majority of the shareholders had, the prior
year, supported a precatory shareholder proposal introduced by
John Chevedden that would have allowed 10% of the
shareholders to call a special meeting.120
In conjunction with the charter amendment, the
Allergan board adopted a set of bylaws specifying the manner
in which the special meeting provision could be used. The
bylaws, which were disclosed in the 2013 proxy statement but
were not submitted to the shareholders for approval, required
extensive disclosure by not just the shareholders who made the
special meeting request but all shareholders who joined the
request. They also prohibited shareholders from “acting in
concert” to request a special meeting, imposed various
117 Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 421 (Del. 1988) (quoting
Datapoint, 496 A.2d at 1036).
118 Hamermesh, Director Nominations, supra note 99, at 143.
119 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, “In Botox Maker Fight, Focus on Clever
Strategy Overshadows the Goal,” N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 12, 2014, 6:19 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/in-allergan-fight-a-focus-on-clever-strategy-ove
rshadows-the-goal/ [http://perma.cc/MW68-9RAA] (describing the battle between
activist Pershing Square and the Allergan board).
120 See A Very Special Shareholder Meeting at Allergan, ACTIVIST INV. BLOG
(Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/The_Activist_Investor/Blog/Entries
/2014/8/12_A_Very_Special_Shareholder_Meeting.html [http://perma.cc/MD5E-V3J7].
Allergan filed a no-action request with the SEC seeking to exclude Chevedden’s proposal
from its proxy statement but was not successful in having the proposal excluded. See
Letter from Ted Yu, SEC Senior Special Counsel, to Matthew J. Maletta, Vice President,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel & Sec’y, Allergan (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.google.com/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiro_a5w97JAhXISyYKH
c4BCZ4QFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sec.gov%2Fdivisions%2Fcorpfin%2Fcf-
noaction%2F14a-8%2F2012%2Fjohnchevedden012512-14a8.pdf&usg=AFQjCNE_jHBd6X
P7I0uh33X4SYyiX65hMA&sig2=HR5Kj9cQrm0PQUufcp3Utw&bvm=bv.110151844,d.e
WE [http://perma.cc/VP3C-T8QR].
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administrative hurdles on shareholders seeking to join the
request, and gave the board extensive discretion over the timing
of the meeting.121
Proxy advisor ISS described the Allergan bylaws as “far
more restrictive than any of the comparator companies the
board apparently reviewed, with no discernable advantage for
Allergan shareholders.”122 Shareholder activist Pershing
Square and Valeant challenged the legality of the bylaws in
conjunction with their efforts to call a special meeting for the
purpose of removing Allergan directors in an attempt to obtain
approval of Valeant’s takeover bid for Allergan.123 Although
Delaware Chancellor Bouchard characterized Allergan’s
restrictions as “quite a horse-choker of a bylaw,”124 the parties
settled their dispute over the scope of the bylaws.125 The request
for a special meeting was mooted when Actavis agreed to purchase
Allergan at a higher price than Valeant was prepared to offer.126 As
a result, many of the issues presented by the Allergan bylaws
were never judicially resolved. 127
Some issuers have used bylaws to impose not only
procedural requirements but also substantive limits on who is
eligible to serve as a director. As with shareholder-proposed
qualification requirements, the permissible scope of such
121 See ALLERGAN, INC., ALLERGAN BYLAWS, art. II (2014)
http://www.allergan.com/miscellaneous-pages/allergan-pdf-files/agn_bylaws [http://per
ma.cc/9C27-ANHN]; see also ALLERGAN, INC., SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION (2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/850693/000119312513098497/d489296ddef14a
.htm [http://perma.cc/K3FA-EUXV] (14A filed by Allergan defending the bylaws).
122 Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Recommends Allergan
Shareholders Call a Special Meeting of Shareholders, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 6, 2014,
3:04 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/institutional-shareholder-services-iss-rec
ommends-allergan-shareholders-call-a-special-meeting-of-shareholders-2014-08-06-152
0240 [http://perma.cc/NTQ3-FLCJ].
123 Valeant, Pershing Go Hostile in $53.8 Billion Allergan Bid, REUTERS (June
2, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/02/pershing-calls-for-removal-of-six-
allergan-directors.html [http://perma.cc/JY7B-RHH9]; Solomon, supra note 110.
124 Solomon, supra note 110.
125 See Allergan Amends Shareholder Meeting Bylaws Ahead of Dec. 18 Meet,
REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2014, 7:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/allergan-
ma-valeant-pharms-idUSL3N0T25DY20141112 [http://perma.cc/6VD2-GUNN] (reporting
that the board amended bylaws in November 2014 to reduce board’s discretion in setting
the special meeting date and lessen the disclosure requirements for shareholders making
a special meeting request).
126 Caroline Humer, Allergan Agrees to $66 Billion Actavis Offer; Valeant Walks,
REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2014, 4:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/17/us-allergan-
actavis-idUSKCN0J00W720141117 [http://perma.cc/E5LW-HC24].
127 Several investors challenged whether the Allergan bylaws could prevent
shareholders from replacing removed directors at the special meeting. In re Allergan,
Inc. Shareholder Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 9609-CB, 2014 WL 5791350, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 7, 2014). The court held that this issue was not ripe. Id. at *1-2.
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bylaws is unclear.128 As one commentator has observed, “the
drafters of [the Delaware statute] noted that qualifications
must not be unreasonably or inequitably imposed.”129
In 2013, 32 issuers used the framework of establishing
director qualifications to respond to the use by activist
shareholders of golden leash compensation arrangements.130 The
adoptions used language suggested by the Wachtell Lipton law
firm, which provided that “no director shall qualify for service” if
he or she is a party to a compensation agreement with a third
party.131 Wachtell explained that a board could adopt such a
bylaw pursuant to its statutory authority to prescribe
qualifications for directors.132 When ISS indicated that it would
recommend against directors who adopted restrictive director
qualification bylaws without shareholder approval,133 most issuers
repealed their golden leash bylaws,134 and Wachtell advised its
clients to refrain from adopting them.135
Boards may also use bylaws to place substantive limits on
otherwise permissible shareholder action. One example is a bylaw
establishing a supermajority requirement for a shareholder
vote.136 In 1999, Shorewood’s board adopted a supermajority
128 See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992) (upholding charter
provision requiring directors to have “substantial expertise in line (as distinct from
staff) positions in the management of substantial business enterprises or substantial
private institutions,” but indicating that a qualification cannot be unreasonably vague);
Stroud v. Milliken Enters., Inc., 585 A.2d 1306, 1308 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that a
corporation can provide for reasonable director qualifications, but observing that “[i]t is
not an overstatement to suggest that every valid by-law is always susceptible to
potential misuse”).
129 Brandon S. Gold, Why the Wachtell Bylaw on Director Compensation by
Shareholders Is Overbroad and May Fail Blasius Scrutiny, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May
31, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/05/31/why-the-wachtell-bylaw-on-dir
ector-compensation-by-shareholders-is-overbroad-and-may-fail-blasius-scrutiny/ [http://
perma.cc/6R3M-AK2M] (citing Del. Gen. Corp. Law Comm., Commentary on
Legislative Proposals, 127th 2d Sess., at 2. (1974)).
130 See Cain et al., supra note 16, at 653.
131 Martin Lipton, Bylaw Protection Against Dissident Director
Conflict/Enrichment Schemes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(May 10, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/10/bylaw-protection-against-
dissident-director-conflictenrichment-schemes [http://perma.cc/N3MT-WVX4].
132 Id.
133 See CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., WHEELING
OUT THE PROCRUSTEANBED: BYLAWRESTRICTIONS ONDISSIDENTNOMINEECOMPENSATION
1 (2013), http://www.thedeal.com/first_word/Wheeling_Out_the_Procrustean_Bed_-_Bylaw_
Restrictions_on_Dissident_Nominee_Compensation-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/9VW8-FLEJ].
134 Cain et al., supra note 16, at 25.
135 Martin Lipton, ISS Publishes Guidance on Director Compensation (and Other
Qualification) Bylaws, HARV. L. SCH. (Jan. 16, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/0
1/16/iss-publishes-guidance-on-director-compensation-and-other-qualification-bylaws/
[http://perma.cc/M6RX-P5FH].
136 Delaware law provides no limit on a board’s power to adopt such a
provision. See Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy, supra note 55, at 487 n.343. In
contrast, the Model Business Corporation Act does not permit a board unilaterally to
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requirement for shareholder amendments to the bylaws as part of
its defense against a takeover attempt by Chesapeake
Corporation.137 The bylaw was challenged, and applying the
standard set out in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum,138 the court found
that the provision was a disproportionate response to the threat
posed in that case.139 The court did not, however, indicate
whether a board-adopted supermajority bylaw would be
generally impermissible.140
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW GOVERNANCE
A. Judicial Oversight of Shareholder Innovations
As noted above, many commentators have argued that
Delaware law limits shareholder power to adopt governance
provisions.141 The most commonly cited rationale for this
limitation is the tension between shareholders’ authority to
amend bylaws under section 109 and the board’s authority to
manage the corporation under section 141(a). As Larry
Hamermesh and others have argued, the Fleming bylaw might
well have been rejected by the Delaware courts on this basis.142
Notably, however, the Delaware courts have provided “a
critical dearth of precedent” on the extent to which board
authority under section 141(a) limits shareholders’ power to
adopt bylaws.143 In a number of cases, the courts appear to have
deliberately avoided offering guidance as to the permissible
scope of the shareholder power under the new governance.144
adopt a provision establishing a supermajority shareholder vote requirement. Id.; see
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.27, 10.21 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
137 Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 296-97 (Del. Ch. 2000).
138 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
139 Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 297.
140 Id. at 343 (“I do not reach Chesapeake’s argument that a board of directors
may not, by bylaw, require a supermajority vote to amend the bylaws.”).
141 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 7, at 140-43 (summarizing this debate);
Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy, supra note 55, at 444.
142 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
143 Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy, supra note 55, at 415.
144 This reticence is at odds with Delaware courts’ general inclination to
provide explicit guidance to future actors even in cases in which that guidance is not
necessary to resolve the case. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1079-80
(2000) (describing this approach in the context of the Chancery Court’s decision in In re
Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996))
[hereinafter Fisch, Peculiar Role]. One possible explanation is, as one commentator
describes it, “that Delaware corporate law is deeply ambivalent regarding the corporate
governance role of shareholders.” Christopher M. Bruner, Shareholder Bylaws and the
Delaware Corporation, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 67, 73 (2009).
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For example, in Diceon Electronics v. Calvary Partners,
the Chancery Court refused to rule on the validity of a director
qualification bylaw proposed by a shareholder in the context of an
election contest.145 The issuer challenged the bylaw as
inconsistent with the board classification provision in the charter.
The court, stating that the shareholders might not approve the
proposed bylaw, explained that “scarce judicial resources must
not be squandered on disputes that have no significant current
impact on the parties and that may never ripen into a question
appropriate for judicial resolution.”146
Similarly, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board
proposed a bylaw at General DataComm that would limit the
board’s power to reprice certain employee stock options.147 In
General DataComm v. Wisconsin Investment Board, the court
again chose not to intervene, refusing to grant the issuer’s motion
for expedited proceedings or an injunction. The court explained
that the issuer had failed to demonstrate a compelling
justification for an expedited ruling in that the shareholders did
not need a resolution of the bylaw’s validity in order to vote on it
and that the issuer was not facing the threat of irreparable harm.
As discussed earlier, the Chancery Court reacted in the
same fashion to Lucian Bebchuk’s effort to litigate the validity
of his second-generation pill redemption bylaw in Bebchuk v.
CA.148 The court concluded that the issue was not ripe, noting that
in both Diceon and DataComm, the shareholders overwhelmingly
rejected the proposed bylaws, obviating the need for a judicial
determination of their validity.149 As the court explained, it was
unnecessary for the court to “prematurely resolve a highly
contentious and important matter before the court knows what
pertinent facts might develop in the future.”150
These cases provide one reason for the lack of clarity
regarding the permissible scope of governance innovations:
ripeness challenges make it difficult to test the validity of
proposed bylaws prior to their adoption. There may be a
circularity to the courts’ approach, however, in that shareholders
may be reluctant to vote in favor of a proposed bylaw if there are
serious questions about its validity.
145 Diceon Elects., Inc. v. Calvary Partners, L. P., Civ. Action. No. 11862, 1990
Del. Ch. LEXIS 209 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 1990).
146 Id. at *3-4.
147 Gen. DataComm Indus., Inc. v. Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818 (Del. Ch. 1999).
148 Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006).
149 Id. at 744.
150 Id.
1660 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:4
These difficulties were partially alleviated when the
Delaware legislature amended its statute to allow the SEC to
certify questions to the court, because the SEC might consider
whether a proposed bylaw was legal under Delaware law in
determining whether an issuer was required by Rule 14a-8 to
include the proposal in its proxy statement.151 The SEC promptly
used the certification procedure to ask the Delaware Supreme
Court whether a bylaw requiring reimbursement of a dissident’s
proxy expenses was valid under Delaware law.152
In CA v. AFSCME, one of the rare cases to address the
legality of shareholder power to enact bylaws, the court sent
somewhat mixed messages.153 The court explained that
shareholders did not have unlimited power to adopt bylaws
under DGCL section 109; rather, such power was limited by the
board’s authority pursuant to section 141. As a result, the court
concluded that the proposed bylaw, although valid and a proper
subject for shareholder action under section 109,154 was
nonetheless invalid as a contractual arrangement that could
preclude the board from discharging its fiduciary duties.155
The Delaware legislature responded to the CA v.
AFSCME decision by amending the Delaware statute in
2011.156 The statutory amendments authorized shareholders to
adopt both proxy access and expense reimbursement bylaws. In
conjunction with these amendments, the legislature identified
permissible conditions that such bylaws could impose, including
disclosure requirements. The legislation did not address the
broader issues raised by shareholder-adopted bylaws that
potentially limit director power. Specifically, the statute did not
speak to the limitations that the court had read section 141(a)
as imposing on shareholder power under section 109.
A recent Chancery Court decision adhered to the
reasoning in CA v. AFSCME to invalidate a different type of
151 76 DEL. LAWS ch. 37, § 1 (2007) (amending DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8));
see Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 771 (2013) (describing certification procedure).
152 CA, Inc. v. AFSCMEEmployees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 230-31 (Del. 2008).
153 The court began its opinion by distinguishing between process-oriented
bylaws and those that mandate how the board should decide “substantive business
decisions.” Id. at 234-35. The court stated that the former do not encroach upon board
authority. It then concluded that the bylaw at issue “has both the intent and the effect
of regulating the process for electing directors of CA.” Id. at 236.
154 Id. at 237.
155 Id. at 238.
156 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (Supp. 2011) (authorizing proxy
access and expense reimbursement bylaws).
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shareholder-adopted bylaw. In Gorman v. Salamone,157 the court
invalidated a bylaw that authorized shareholders to remove and
replace corporate officers without cause. The court, citing CA v.
AFSCME, stated that shareholder power to amend the bylaws
was not plenary and that such power was limited to procedural
bylaws. It then explained that the bylaw in question was not
process-oriented but rather allowed shareholders to make
substantive business decisions. As a result, the court concluded
that the bylaw interfered with the directors’ authority to
manage the company and was therefore invalid.158
B. Judicial Review of Board-Initiated Governance
Because DGCL section 141(a) operates as a limit on
shareholder power but not board power, board-adopted bylaws
are subject to a different type of analysis. The case law takes a
two-step approach. The first step asks whether the bylaw
addresses permissible subject matter—that is, whether the
bylaw is facially valid as within the board’s statutory power.159
The second step considers the context in which the provision is
adopted or deployed. The courts have specifically observed that
a facially permissible action may be invalid if undertaken for
an improper purpose.160
The question of facial validity is generally easy—boards
have broad statutory authority to adopt bylaws. As the court
explained in ATP v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,
Under Delaware law, a corporation’s bylaws are “presumed to be valid,
and the courts will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the
law rather than strike down the bylaws.” To be facially valid, a bylaw
must be authorized by the Delaware General Corporation Law [],
consistent with the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, and its
enactment must not be otherwise prohibited.161
157 Gorman v. Salamone, C.A., No. 10183-VCN, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202 (Del.
Ch. July 31, 2015).
158 Id. Notably, the Delaware statute explicitly vests the board with the
authority to appoint corporate officers. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2016).
159 See, e.g., ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014).
160 See, e.g., id. at 558 (“Bylaws that may otherwise be facially valid will not
be enforced if adopted or used for an inequitable purpose.”); Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (stating that “inequitable action does not
become permissible simply because it is legally possible”); see also Moran v. Household
Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (concluding that although the board had the
power to adopt a poison pill, the “ultimate response” of the board to a takeover “must
be judged by the [d]irectors’ actions at that time”).
161 ATP Tour, Inc., 91 A.3d at 557-58 (quoting Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus.,
501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) (footnotes omitted)).
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Because corporation statutes vest the board with
general managerial authority, there is no reason to view board
authority to adopt bylaws as limited in the way that shareholder
authority might be limited by section 141(a). Moreover, the
Delaware statute authorizes bylaws that address a broad range
of matters, stating that the bylaws “may contain any
provision . . . relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs and its rights or powers or rights or
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”162
The fact that a board-adopted governance provision is
facially valid does not end the analysis. Delaware courts have
applied heightened scrutiny to claims that board actions,
including the adoption of bylaws, are improper in the context of a
specific dispute or transaction.163 In Boilermakers v. Chevron,164
the court explained that “a statutorily and contractually valid
bylaw may operate inequitably in a particular scenario.”165
Similarly, in ATP,166 the court stated that “[b]ylaws that may
otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if adopted or
used for an inequitable purpose.”167 Citing Schnell v. Chris-
Craft,168 the court observed that “inequitable action does not
become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”169
Delaware courts have applied this analysis and
considered the adoption and use of board-adopted bylaws on a
case-by-case basis. In Hollinger International v. Black, the court
invalidated bylaws that required board decisions to be unanimous
and imposed a board quorum requirement at 80%, finding that
the bylaws “were clearly adopted for an inequitable purpose and
have an inequitable effect.”170 In contrast, similar bylaw
provisions were upheld in Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EAC
Industries.171 Critical to the courts’ decisions in the two cases
were the specific factual contexts in which the challenged
bylaws were adopted.172
Delaware law also provides two lines of authority for
heightened review from the takeover context. In Unocal, the
162 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015).
163 See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 (stating that corporate action must “be
evaluated when and if the issue arises”).
164 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
165 Id. at 949.
166 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d 554.
167 Id. at 558.
168 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
169 ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558.
170 Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 2004).
171 Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
172 See also Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 1985)
(invalidating board-adopted bylaws because of the “underlying intent” behind them).
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court held that when a board adopts defensive measures in the
control context, those measures must be both reasonable and
proportional to the threat posed.173 Furthermore, defensive
measures may not be preclusive, coercive, or draconian.174 In
Blasius, the court held that board actions taken for the primary
purpose of interfering with a shareholder vote require a
compelling justification, even if such actions are otherwise
within the board’s legal authority.175 Courts have frequently
analyzed board adoption or application of governance bylaws
under the Unocal and/or Blasius standards.176
C. Advantages of the Case-Specific Approach
The courts’ case-by-case evaluation of new governance
provisions is characteristic of Delaware lawmaking.177 By
viewing a bylaw within the context of the specific action in
which it is to be applied, a court is able to assess its impact in
light of the firm’s ownership structure and in conjunction with
other firm-specific governance provisions. Similarly, the courts’
unwillingness to speculate as to the potential validity of a
bylaw before it is adopted and applied enables market forces to
restrain and redress overreaching and, in many cases, avoid
the need for judicial intervention.
Developments in shareholder voting and the availability
of market discipline reinforce the value of a market-based
approach. For example, institutional investors carefully
scrutinize board governance decisions and frequently challenge
board decisions that are viewed as limiting shareholder
rights.178 Shareholder dissatisfaction with board responsiveness
can lead to more withhold votes in subsequent director
elections, a challenge that has new teeth for issuers that have
adopted majority voting.179
173 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
174 Unitrin, Inc. v. Amer. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995).
175 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch.1988). The
question of whether a case will trigger Blasius review is complex, and the courts have
frequently rejected the argument that the Blasius standard applies. See, e.g., Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992) (finding that, on the facts presented, “it cannot be
said that the ‘primary purpose’ of the board’s action was to interfere with or impede
exercise of the shareholder franchise”).
176 See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d
25 (Del. Ch. 1998) (upholding advance notice provision in special meeting bylaw under
Unocal standard).
177 See Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 144.
178 See Cain et al., supra note 16, at 3, 24-25.
179 See id. at 24-25 (finding greater responsiveness to withhold votes by
issuers that were subject to a majority voting rule); see also Choi et al., Majority
Voting, supra note 84 (describing impact of a majority voting rule on director behavior).
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Market discipline has been enhanced by the emergence
of intermediaries that bring governance problems to the
attention of institutional investors, helping to overcome
information costs and collective action problems. The proxy
advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis play a major role in
identifying and publicizing board-adopted bylaw provisions
that they view as value decreasing.180 Moreover, ISS attempts
to persuade institutional investors to discipline directors by
recommending against directors who adopt a bylaw that reduces
shareholder rights.181 Because an ISS “withhold” recommendation
raises the visibility of that director election and creates the
possibility that the director will, even in the absence of a
competing candidate, receive a high percentage of no or withhold
votes, the threat of the withhold recommendation can have a
significant effect on director behavior.182 For example, after
directors who adopted a golden leash compensation bylaw at
Provident Bank received a high number of withhold votes in
response to an ISS withhold recommendation, directors at
other firms quickly repealed similar bylaws.183
Activist hedge funds are increasingly playing a similar
role. As Gilson and Gordon explain, activists can exercise
shareholder governance rights in a way that increases value for
other shareholders.184 This in turn leads institutional investors
to place a higher value on governance rights—a value that may
be reflected in market price.185 It also leads even passive
institutions to value shareholder governance rights and to vote
in favor of governance changes that increase the possibility of a
successful activist engagement.
The result is both experimentation and an evolutionary
model of governance that is capable of responding to changing
market conditions. Indeed, this so-called indeterminacy has been
widely cited as one of the more valuable features of Delaware
law.186 Notably, it is a feature distinguished by judicial lawmaking
freedom as opposed to greater legislative intervention.187
180 See Cain et al., supra note 16, at 12 (describing ISS’s role in
communicating concerns over golden leash bylaws to institutional investors).
181 Id. at 24-25.
182 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of
Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 873-74 (2010) (quantifying the
effect of an ISS withhold recommendation in an uncontested director election).
183 See Cain et al., supra note 16, at 25 (reporting high withhold votes from
directors at issuers that adopted golden leash compensation bylaws).
184 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 2, at 897.
185 Cf. Cain et al., supra note 16, at 47 (discussing market pricing of provisions
in context of expected activism).
186 See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some
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The reliance on market discipline does not prevent
Delaware courts from invalidating board-adopted bylaws when
they deem it necessary. In Chesapeake v. Shore, for example,
the court applied both Unocal and Blasius to invalidate a
supermajority bylaw adopted by the Shorewood board in an
attempt to prevent Chesapeake from using a consent solicitation
to replace the Shorewood board.188 The court concluded that the
supermajority provision, in the context of Chesapeake’s consent
solicitation, was preclusive under Unocal because it made victory
by Chesapeake “not realistically attainable.”189 The court
further held that the bylaw interfered with the shareholder
franchise and that, because the board failed to demonstrate a
compelling justification for this interference, its actions were
invalid under Blasius.190 Similarly, Chancellor Bouchard’s
remarks in the Allergan hearing suggested a willingness to
examine seriously the potential that the bylaws “perhaps
impermissibly deprive the shareholders of a fair opportunity to
remove directors.”191
IV. LITIGATION BYLAWS
A. Governance Innovation and Litigation Bylaws
The most recent governance innovations are litigation
bylaws. Litigation bylaws respond to concerns over the
frequency and quality of shareholder litigation,192 with
Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1412-13 (2005) (terming this “the genius of
our law”); Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 144, at 1085 (arguing that Delaware law’s
indeterminacy allows judges to respond to new circumstances); William B. Chandler III
& Anthony A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response to Professors Carney and
Shepherd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,” 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
95, 97-98 (2009) (explaining that indeterminacy results from the messiness of real
world cases).
187 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1591 (2005) (“The most noteworthy trait of
Delaware’s corporate law is the extent to which important and controversial legal rules are
promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by the legislature.”); see also In re
Appraisal of Dell Inc., Consol. C.A., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184 (Del. Ch. May
11, 2015) (defending the judiciary’s role in developing Delaware corporate law).
188 Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 296-97 (Del. Ch. 2000). The
board actually adopted a package of five amendments to the bylaws—all designed to
make Chesapeake’s removal of the sitting board less likely. See id. at 305. Chesapeake
only challenged the supermajority provision. Id. at 312.
189 Id. at 341-42.
190 Id. at 345.
191 Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiff ’s Motion to Expedite and Rulings
of the Court, PS Fund 1 LLC v. Allergan, Inc., No. 10057-CB, 2014 WL 4986715, at *26
(Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2014).
192 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015).
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provisions aimed at addressing alleged litigation abuse. Issuers
have adopted three basic types of litigation bylaws: exclusive
forum (forum-selection) bylaws, fee-shifting (loser-pays) bylaws,
and arbitration bylaws. Both the proliferation of litigation bylaws
and the Delaware legislature’s 2015 response challenge
Delaware’s traditional approach to governance innovation and
raise questions about the role of judicial oversight in monitoring
the adoption and use of governance bylaws.
Exclusive forum bylaws respond specifically to the
phenomenon of multiforum litigation—lawsuits filed in
multiple jurisdictions challenging the same transaction. They
respond, in a contractual way, by designating one or more
permissible forums for litigation in advance. Vice-Chancellor
Laster first suggested the possibility of an exclusive forum bylaw
in the 2010 case In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders Litigation.193
Following Revlon, a number of issuers adopted exclusive forum
provisions, generally by means of board-adopted bylaws.194
Shareholders reacted negatively to these adoptions,195 and
several filed suit challenging the bylaws as improper under
Delaware law.196 In response to the adverse reaction, most
issuers backed down and repealed their bylaws rather than
attempting to defend them in court.197 Two issuers, however—
Chevron and FedEx—defended the bylaws in litigation.198
In Boilermakers v. Chevron,199 then-Chancellor Strine
endorsed the use of exclusive forum bylaws. Writing broadly,
Strine said that the board’s statutory power to adopt bylaws
under section 109 clearly extended to the bylaw in question.
Strine explicitly endorsed a board’s ability to respond to new
situations and explained that the fact that a board-adopted bylaw
involves a new use of statutory authority does not make it
193 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
194 See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to
Multiforum Shareholder Litigation 11 (ECGI Working Paper Series in L., Working
Paper No. 295/2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624951 [http://perma.cc/H49U-YXZY];
Claudia H. Allen, Trends in Exclusive Forum Bylaws, THE CONFERENCE BD., 2 (Jan.
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411715 [http://perma.cc/V38R-NU4P].
195 ISS has a general policy of recommending against directors who vote to
adopt bylaws that reduce shareholder rights. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES
(ISS), 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY GUIDELINES 23 (2014). Glass Lewis has an
even stronger position: it recommends against all forum selection bylaws and “will
recommend voting against the chairman of the governance committee, or, in the
absence of such a committee, the chairman of the board, who served during the period
of time when the provision was adopted.” GLASS LEWIS & CO., PROXY PAPER
GUIDELINES: 2015 PROXY SEASON 18-19 (2015).
196 Romano & Sanga, supra note 194, at 11.
197 Id.
198 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 937 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
199 Id.
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invalid.200 The court further rejected the argument that the
board’s action was improper because it acted unilaterally, noting
that shareholders who were unhappy with a board’s adoption of a
forum selection bylaw were free to repeal it.201 Finally, Strine
characterized an issuer’s bylaws as a type of contract between
the corporation and its shareholders and explained that the
application and interpretation of bylaws should be understood
in contract terms.202
Since the Boilermakers decision, the popularity of
exclusive forum bylaws has increased dramatically. As of August
2014, 746 U.S. public companies had adopted them.203 Of the mid-
stream adoptions, more than 60% were adopted without a
shareholder vote.204 Courts both within and outside of Delaware
have largely respected forum selection bylaws and dismissed
lawsuits filed in jurisdictions other than those specified by the
bylaws. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court overturned a
trial court decision refusing to enforce a Delaware forum selection
bylaw and held that the bylaw was both valid and enforceable
under Oregon law.205 Similarly, in City of Providence v. First
Citizens BancShares, the Delaware Chancery Court deferred to
the decision by a Delaware corporation to select a North
Carolina forum.206 Early evidence suggests that exclusive forum
bylaws may be reducing the extent of multiforum litigation in
merger cases.207
200 Id. at 953 (explaining that “boards of Delaware corporations have the
flexibility to respond to changing dynamics in ways that are authorized by our
statutory law”).
201 Id. at 956 (“[T]he statutory regime provides protections for the
stockholders, through the indefeasible right of the stockholders to adopt and amend
bylaws themselves.”).
202 Id. at 955 (“[T]he bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between
a Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”); see also Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products &
Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (observing that modern bylaws are
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”) (citing Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l
Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990)).
203 Romano & Sanga, supra note 194, at 2. Half of the adoptions have been in
IPO companies. Id. at 25.
204 Id. at 27.
205 Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328 (Or. 2015). The
court noted that it was consistent with Oregon public policy to defer to Delaware law
on the internal relationship between a Delaware corporation and its shareholders. Id.
at 337-38.
206 Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 234-35 (Del.
Ch. 2014).
207 See MATTHEW D. CAIN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, TAKEOVER
LITIGATION IN 2014, at 3 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567902 [http://perma.cc/
BE5J-Q74C] (reporting that multistate takeover litigation has declined for the past
three years and suggesting that the increasing use of forum selection provisions may
provide a possible explanation); see also Romano & Sanga, supra note 194, at 4
(providing evidence that adoption of forum selection provisions does not reflect
managerial opportunism).
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A second, more controversial type of litigation bylaw
requires a shareholder that is unsuccessful in litigation to pay
the defendants’ attorneys’ fees. These fee-shifting bylaws
contravene the traditional American rule208 and impose a
potentially substantial financial penalty on shareholders seeking
to bring class actions and derivative suits. In 2014, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in response to a certified question, upheld the
facial validity of loser-pays bylaws in ATP.209 Relying heavily on
the court’s analysis of the bylaws as a contract,210 the ATP court
observed that no provision in the Delaware statute or case law
forbid the adoption of fee-shifting bylaws and that a bylaw that
allocated litigation risk among parties in corporate litigation
properly related to the business of the corporation under section
109.211 The court further observed that it was not called upon to
consider the issue of enforcement212 and that the possibility that
the bylaw might not be enforceable in a particular context was
not a basis for finding it facially invalid.213
A final type of litigation bylaw requires specified claims to
be brought in an arbitration proceeding rather than through
litigation.214 Commentators began to speculate over the potential
208 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix
Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015)
(explaining how Delaware law has shifted away from the American rule to a system in
which the corporation always pays).
209 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014).
210 See id. at 558 (describing corporate bylaws as “contracts among a
corporation’s shareholders” (quoting Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d
1182, 1188 (Del. 2010))).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 559. For cases considering this issue, see Kastis v. Carter, C.A. No.
8657-CB, 2014 WL 3708238 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2014), and Strougo v. Hollander, C.A.
No. 9770-CB (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc
=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwipmYOM8-_JAhUKGD4KHW5
tBJYQFggfMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcourts.delaware.gov%2Fopinions%2Fdownload.asp
x%3FID%3D220870&usg=AFQjCNGcEQ4fn9muENSblR7wL9I8S5KlBA&sig2=bzz_druj-
w_4P31nSrI2PQ [http://perma.cc/7Z3G-MRLR]. In Strougo, the Delaware court held that a
fee-shifting bylaw that had been adopted after a shareholder had been cashed out could not
validly be applied to that shareholder’s claims. The court expressly noted that it was not
called upon to consider the facial validity of the bylaw. Strougo, No. 9770-CB, at 1.
213 ATP, 91 A.3d at 560. In 1999, a shareholder attempted to use Rule 14a-8 to
propose a fee-shifting bylaw. The issuer successfully argued to the SEC that the
provision violated “general principles of contract law” and “public policy.” See 3Com
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 595, at *17-21 (June 24, 1999).
In 2014, Alibaba, which has a fee-shifting bylaw, successfully completed a public
offering of its stock without interference by the SEC. See Kevin LaCroix, IPO
Companies and Fee-Shifting Bylaws, D&O DIARY (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/10/articles/ipos/ipo-companies-and-fee-shifting-bylaws/
[http://perma.cc/3654-BX5N]. Note that Alibaba is incorporated in the Grand Caymans,
not Delaware. Id.
214 See generally David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class
Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 201 (2015) (discussing potential legality and impact of
arbitration bylaws).
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board adoption of arbitration bylaws as a response to litigation
abuse in light of the broad rationale for the court’s decision to
uphold forum selection bylaws in Boilermakers, as well as the
U.S. Supreme Court’s continued support of contractual
arbitration provisions.215 The potential of arbitration bylaws was
enhanced by decisions by courts in Maryland and Massachusetts
applying the reasoning of the Boilermakers decision to uphold
the validity of a mandatory arbitration bylaw adopted by a
Maryland REIT.216 The SEC has questioned whether an issuer
can use a bylaw to compel the arbitration of shareholder
securities fraud claims.217 It is unclear, however, whether the
SEC has the power to prohibit a board from adopting a bylaw
mandating arbitration of state law claims.218
B. Delaware’s Legislative Response to Litigation Bylaws
In 2015, the Delaware legislature amended the Delaware
corporation statute explicitly to address litigation bylaws. The
legislation had three components.219 First, the amendments
expressly authorized Delaware corporations to select the courts of
the state of Delaware as an exclusive forum for the litigation of
internal corporate claims through either a charter or bylaw
provision.220 Second, the statute prohibited Delaware corporations
from adopting an exclusive forum provision that did not include a
215 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013)
(upholding class action waiver and arbitration provision in credit card contract);
Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L.
751, 751 (2015) (defending value and enforceability of board-adopted arbitration bylaws).
216 Katz v. CommonWealth REIT, Case No. 24-C-13-001299, at 39 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 19, 2014); Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth REIT, Case No. 24-C-13-
001111, 2013 WL 1915769, at *26-27 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013); Del. Cty. Emps. Ret.
Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405-DJC, at *18-21 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014).
217 See, e.g., Hal Scott & Leslie Silverman, SEC’s Silent Opposition to
Arbitration Bylaws Is Speaking Volumes, COMMITTEE ON CAP. MKTS. REG. (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://capmktsreg.org/news/secs-silent-opposition-to-arbitration-bylaws-is-speaking-volumes
[http://perma.cc/T2V5-2PN7] (describing SEC’s ongoing opposition to arbitration bylaws);
see also Letter from Ted Yu, Senior Special Counsel, SEC, to Matthew Lepore, Pfizer, dated
Feb. 22, 2012 (explaining that there appears to be some basis for the view that a
shareholder-proposed arbitration bylaw would be inconsistent with the federal
securities laws).
218 SeeWebber, supra note 214, at 208-09.
219 Synopsis, Senate Bill No. 75, LEGIS.DELAWARE.GOV, http://legis.delaware.
gov/LIS/lis148.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+75 [http://perma.cc/R9YM-JGBC] (last visited Apr.
14, 2016); see Kevin M. LaCroix, Del. Bans ‘Loser Pays’ Bylaws—What Questions
Remain?, LAW360 (June 16, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/668001/del-
bans-loser-pays-bylaws-what-questions-remain [http://perma.cc/FVQ5-8BEN] (describing
legislative adoption of Senate Bill 75 on June 11, 2015).
220 The statute defines internal corporate claims as “claims, including claims
in the right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current
or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title
confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2016).
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Delaware court as a forum. Third, the legislation forbade
corporations from adopting a charter or bylaw provision that
imposed liability upon a stockholder in connection with the
litigation of an internal corporate claim.221
The amendments were the result of a yearlong process
following the ATP decision. Less than a month after the decision,
the Executive Committee of the Delaware State Bar Association
approved a legislative proposal, Senate Bill 236, which would
have banned fee-shifting bylaws at stock corporations.222 Business
interests responded. The Chamber of Commerce wrote to
Delaware Senator Bryan Townsend, defending fee-shifting bylaws
as a valuable “new tool . . . which businesses could use to reduce
the amount of unnecessary litigation that accompanies corporate
mergers and acquisitions.”223 The Chamber argued that the
matter required further study.224 The legislature responded by
adopting a joint resolution asking the Bar to reconsider the
proposal and to give business interests the opportunity to provide
their input.225 Institutional investors engaged in a letter-writing
campaign in support of a legislative ban on fee-shifting
bylaws;226 business interests mounted a campaign in opposition
to such a ban.227
On March 6, 2015, the Council issued a second proposal
and explanation.228 The Council identified several problems
with fee-shifting bylaws and warned that they would make even
meritorious litigation untenable, curtail the development of
Delaware corporate law, and potentially invite the federal
government to intervene in an effort to ensure board and
221 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b).
222 Id.; Jonathan Starkey, Chamber Forces Delay on Fee-Shifting Legislation,
DELAWAREONLINE (June 10, 2014, 1:52 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/
firststatepolitics/2014/06/10/fee-shifting-bill/10280791/ [http://perma.cc/FVQ5-8BEN];
S.B. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014).
223 Letter from Andrew Wynne, Director, State Legislative Affairs, to Senator
Bryan Townsend (June 5, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1184979-
chamber-letter-to-townsend.html [http://perma.cc/9NFY-PVRM].
224 Id.
225 See S.J. Res. 12, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014).
226 See Letter to Governor Jack Markell (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.cii.org/files/
issues_and_advocacy/legal_issues/Letter%20to%20Governor%20Markell%20(Final).pdf
[http://perma.cc/DGE8-T8DM] (“[A]sking for swift legislative action to curtail the spread
of so-called ‘fee shifting’ bylaws.”).
227 See Letter to Members of the Delaware Senate from Harold Kin, Executive Vice
President, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (May 6, 2015), http://www.instituteforleg
alreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ILR_Letter_to_DE_Senate.pdf [http://perma.cc/WF7T-HFAA]
(warning that the ban “calls into question Delaware’s commitment to maintaining the
balanced legal system that until now has been the hallmark of its corporate franchise”).
228 See Explanation of Council Legislative Proposal, http://www.corporate
defensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-EXPLANATORY-P
APER-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6U7-8CRF] (last visited June 17, 2016).
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management accountability. In addition, the Council explained
that fee-shifting provisions were an unnecessary response to
frivolous litigation and that courts and issuers had other tools
available to address litigation abuse. On June 11, 2015, the
legislature adopted the Council’s proposal.229
The effect of the legislation is straightforward. Delaware
corporations are authorized to adopt a charter or bylaw provision
that selects the Delaware courts as the exclusive forum for
shareholder litigation. They are also authorized to select a non-
Delaware forum in addition to, but not to the exclusion of, the
Delaware courts. A provision selecting the headquarters state
rather than Delaware, as in City of Providence v. First Citizens, is
not permitted. Similarly, because arbitration bylaws do not allow
litigation in Delaware courts, they are prohibited by the
amendments. Finally, the amendments bar provisions that
impose liability for attorneys’ fees on shareholder plaintiffs, but
they do not speak to the use of bylaws that limit or forbid the
award of attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs.230
C. Justifying the Legislative Response
The 2015 legislation reflects an unprecedented departure
from Delaware’s traditional approach to corporate law. First, the
mandatory nature of the amendments is in marked contrast to
the broadly enabling structure of the Delaware statute.231 Very
few provisions in the statute impose mandatory rules on
corporations.232 For example, the statute does not require
corporate boards to have a minimum number of independent
directors or provide a definition of what constitutes independence.
Nor does it impose criteria for board service or minimum
qualifications for officers or require a corporation to establish
particular board committees. The statute does not dictate a
229 LaCroix, supra note 219.
230 See A. Thompson Bayliss & Mark Mixon, “No Pay” Provisions: The Forgotten
Middle Ground in the Fee-Shifting Battle, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN.
REG. (June 1, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/01/no-pay-provisions-the-
forgotten-middle-ground-in-the-fee-shifting-battle/ [http://perma.cc/QY42-D9UN] (proposing
no-fee bylaws).
231 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law
and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 674
(2005) (“[T]he Delaware approach to corporate law keeps statutory mandates to a
minimum. And even some of the mandatory terms are subject to being overridden
through charter and bylaw provisions.”).
232 For exceptions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2015) (restricting
circumstances under which a board may declare a dividend); id. at § 211(b) (requiring
an annual meeting of shareholders).
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required capital structure, mandate equal voting rights, or even
require that common stock be entitled to vote.
Indeed, both the legislature and the courts have generally
taken a permissive approach to corporate governance innovation,
leaving the market to evaluate firm-specific governance changes
and to impose discipline on firms that adopt poor governance
provisions. Although scholars actively debate the extent to which
this market discipline is effective,233 Delaware courts defer to
market forces. This deference is particularly appropriate given the
dominance of Delaware incorporation among large, publicly traded
corporations that are most subject to the disciplinary force of the
market, as implemented through the trading decisions of
institutional investors, analysts’ coverage, and proxy advisors’
recommendations.234
This enabling approach can be defended on several
grounds. First, it may be difficult to determine the substantive
effect of governance innovations.235 A regulatory response creates
the risk of regulatory error. Instead, firm-specific innovation
offers the opportunity to test particular provisions and evaluate
their effect on firm value. Second, particular governance
innovations may have a differential impact—increasing the
value of some firms and decreasing the value of others.236 An
enabling rule allows efficient, firm-specific tailoring. Finally,
the business world is dynamic. An enabling approach allows
the corporate structure to respond to business developments
more quickly than would be possible through regulation (and
without the potential political gridlock that sometimes limits
the scope of regulatory reform).
Even where Delaware law has limited the scope of
governance innovation, it has done so through incremental and
contextual judicial decisionmaking rather than broad-based
legislation. Thus, for example, although Delaware courts
233 See Cain et al., supra note 16, at 658-59 (reporting inconsistent results
from studies of the price effect of governance innovation and positing that this might be
“due in part to the well-known methodological problems associated with measuring the
wealth effects of corporate governance terms”).
234 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (explaining role of mandatory
disclosure regulation in facilitating market discipline imposed by information traders).
235 See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 16, at 6 (warning that the market may not
price governance provisions unless and until they have the potential to impact a
specific issuer and that market reaction may also depend on the salience of the
governance term).
236 See, e.g., Martijn Cremers & Simone Sepe, The Shareholder Value of
Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 65 (2016) (demonstrating that staggered boards
are particularly valuable for firms with long-term customers or in industries that
require relationship-specific investments).
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approved director authority to adopt a poison pill, the courts
both provided parameters regarding the basis for the decision
to adopt a pill and the circumstances under which a board
might be barred from continuing to use a pill to thwart a
takeover attempt.237 Similarly, the courts imposed limits on the
permissible structure of a pill, invalidating, for example, pills
that limited the authority of future boards.238
The 2015 legislation explicitly prevents issuers from
engaging in private ordering with respect to litigation bylaws;
instead, it both mandates the inclusion of a Delaware court in a
forum selection provision and completely bans fee shifting. In
addition, the amendments override the role of Delaware courts
in policing innovation with respect to litigation bylaws on a
case-by-case basis. On what grounds, if any, can these
departures from Delaware’s traditional approach be justified?
One possibility is that they cannot, and the legislation is
purely protectionist,239 favoring the interests of the Delaware
Bar in particular.240 Commentators have described Delaware
corporate law as driven by interest groups,241 and the most
influential interest group consists of the Delaware lawyers who
play a pivotal role in the development of corporate
legislation.242 By preserving both the existing volume of
Delaware litigation and Delaware as a forum, the legislation
serves the interests of both the plaintiff and defense Bar.
Although interest group politics undoubtedly played a
role in the legislation, viewing the legislation as a product of
interest group self-interest is both superficial and incomplete.
Delaware’s dominance in corporate law benefits a variety of
interest groups beyond Delaware litigation lawyers, including
237 See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 54-55 (Del.
Ch. 2011); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch. 1985).
238 See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1282-83 (Del.
1998) (invalidating delayed-redemption provision in poison pill).
239 The Council explicitly noted this claim. See Explanation of Council,
Legislative Proposal, supra note 228, at 10 (acknowledging and rejecting criticism that
the proposed legislation was “a protectionist act intended to enrich the members of the
Council and their firms by invalidating measures that would significantly diminish
litigation in Delaware”).
240 See, e.g., John L. Reed, Delaware (Again) Proposes Sledgehammering Fee-
Shifting Bylaws, DLA PIPER (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insi
ghts/publications/2015/03/delaware-again-proposes-sledgehammering/ [http://perma
.cc/MS52-S3NP] (describing the legislation as a “litigation land grab”).
241 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-
Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987).
242 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware
Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (2006) (describing the role of the
Delaware Council).
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Delaware taxpayers.243 Although the legislation may protect the
turf of Delaware litigators, it risks adversely affecting other
Delaware interests by reducing the demand for Delaware
incorporation. Specifically, the 2015 legislation creates an
opportunity for other states to compete with Delaware by
offering issuers the freedom to adopt litigation bylaws
prohibited by Delaware law.244 To the extent that issuers value
the freedom to adopt litigation bylaws barred by the legislation,
they may, at the margin, choose to leave Delaware in favor of
incorporating in other states.245
An alternative explanation is that the legislation was
necessary to protect shareholder rights. The basis for
concluding that litigation bylaws inflict a distinctive form of
shareholder harm, however, is unclear. Delaware corporate law
authorizes issuers to adopt a variety of structural provisions
that arguably impose greater limits on shareholder rights than
litigation bylaws, including dual class stock,246 effective
staggered boards,247 and supermajority voting requirements.248
In addition, although the loser-pays bylaw in ATP was
extreme, the legislation prohibits even more moderate
provisions.249
Moreover, at the time the legislature acted, the potential
impact of litigation bylaws was unknown. Only 30 Delaware
corporations adopted loser-pays bylaws following the ATP
243 See Stephen Bainbridge, Delaware’s Decision: Viewing Fee Shifting Bylaws
Through a Public Choice Lens (Nov. 18, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.professor
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/delawares-decision-viewing-fee-shifting-
bylaws-through-a-public-choice-lens.html [http://perma.cc/58V3-E7B4] (noting that
Delaware franchise taxes account for up to 30% of the state’s budget, the equivalent of
$3,000 for a family of four).
244 Indeed, one state has already done so. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1162
(2015). Notably, the Oklahoma statute goes further than permitting fee-shifting
bylaws; it requires fee-shifting in unsuccessful derivative litigation. Id.
245 The Delaware council recognized this concern. See Explanation of Council,
Legislative Proposal, supra note 228, at 10 (“[O]ther states may take steps to
accommodate fee-shifting charter and bylaw provisions, and [ ] businesses will
therefore choose to incorporate in those other states, rather than in Delaware.”).
246 See Reed, supra note 240 (questioning whether the legislation can be justified in
terms of fairness to shareholders in light of the permissibility of dual class stock).
247 See Bebchuk Bylaw, supra note 61, at 2 (demonstrating the strength of
an effective staggered board in protecting management from the discipline of the
takeover market).
248 See C.WILLIAMPHILLIPS&PREETHIKRISHNAMURTHY, COVINGTON&BURLING,
THE LANDSCAPE OFU.S. HOSTILE TAKEOVER LITIGATION 10-11 (2011), https://www.cov.com/
~/media/files/corporate/publications/2001/12/oid6533.pdf [http://perma.cc/YYG4-SQUD]
(describing how supermajority provisions can operate to impede shareholders’ ability to
accept a hostile tender offer).
249 See Reed, supra note 240 (“[T]here is no room for a middle ground of
proportionate fee allocation, or a measured cap system. . . . ”).
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decision,250 and there were reasons to question whether boards
would have been willing or able to adopt such provisions to the
extent they were perceived by institutional shareholders or ISS
as interfering with shareholder rights.251 In addition, the
statute extends to litigation bylaws that are approved by the
shareholders. It is reasonable to conclude that the adoption of a
litigation bylaw through a process that involves both board and
shareholder approval might reasonably reflect a judgment that,
for that issuer, the provision adds value by reducing the cost of
frivolous litigation. The basis for the legislature to second-
guess that judgment is not compelling.
Another possibility, suggested by my colleague Ed Rock
and examined by Armour, Black, and Cheffins,252 is that the
legislature viewed the 2015 legislation as necessary to protect the
manner in which Delaware lawmaking occurs. To the extent that
Delaware’s lawmaking is distinctive because of the judicial role,253
that distinctiveness is undercut if the viability of Delaware
litigation is reduced, because the Delaware courts will have fewer
opportunities to weigh in and provide guidance to issuers.254 This
reduces the predictive value of Delaware law and weakens
Delaware’s attractiveness as a state of incorporation.255 Notably,
in contrast to the distinctive role of the Delaware courts, the
provisions of the Delaware statute are more easily copied by other
states. In addition, reducing litigation volume lessens the
lawmaking role of the expert Delaware Chancery Court judges.
Under this theory, litigation bylaws are distinctive and
problematic, not because of the impact on shareholders, but
because of the impact on Delaware lawmaking.
If the legislative objective was to protect Delaware
litigation, however, the absolute ban on all fee-shifting bylaws
appears to be both over- and underinclusive. As noted above,
although the Council stated that fee-shifting bylaws would make
stockholder litigation “[u]ntenable,”256 a more moderate fee-
shifting bylaw would be unlikely to reduce the volume of
250 See Explanation of Council, Legislative Proposal, supra note 228, at 3.
251 See Cain et al., supra note 16, at 25-26 (noting that 30 of 32 issuers
repealed golden leash prohibition bylaws in response to criticism from ISS and
institutional investors).
252 See John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Is Delaware
Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 605 (2012).
253 Fisch, Peculiar Role, supra note 144, at 1064.
254 Armour et al., supra note 252, at 652.
255 See id. (“[I]f Delaware loses a significant number of quality cases, this
would impair the ability of its courts to develop new precedents. In the long run, this
might diminish Delaware’s value-added for firms and affect its market share in
incorporations, its ability to charge a premium price to public companies, or both.”).
256 Explanation of Council, supra note 228, at 3.
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Delaware litigation to the point where the role of the Delaware
courts and the evolution of Delaware law are adversely affected.
At the same time, the legislation does not address other bylaws
that might burden shareholder litigation.257 Boards can
presumably adopt alternative approaches such as bylaws that
require minimum ownership thresholds, limit the scope of
available damages, or eliminate the availability of fees to
prevailing plaintiffs.258 There are many governance innovations
that reduce the availability of shareholder litigation, and it is
likely that if market forces find the existing level of litigation to
be excessive, this legislation will not end the battle.
In commenting on a prior draft of this article at the
Pomerantz Lecture, Charles Elson offered the explanation that
the Delaware legislature sought to maintain a corporate law
that balanced the interests of shareholders and managers.259
Elson argued that the legislature has intervened in situations
in which the law has drifted away from that balance, citing the
adoption of DGCL section 102(b)(7) after the court’s decision in
Smith v. Van Gorkom.260 Other commentators have also
described Delaware corporate law as balanced, noting, for
example, that Delaware adopted a moderate antitakeover
statute261 rather than the approach like that of either
California, which has no antitakeover statute,262 or
Pennsylvania, which has an extreme one.263
Significantly, however, prior legislative interventions
have created options, not mandatory rules. Section 102(b)(7)
authorizes but does not require issuers to limit director liability
257 Indeed, the Delaware Council explicitly explained that “the proposed
legislation does not deprive corporations of the ability to adopt other provisions that
address unproductive stockholder litigation by means other than fee-shifting.” Id. at 9.
258 See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting
the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal
for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559-63 (2015) [hereinafter Fisch et al., Peppercorn];
Bayliss & Mixon, supra note 230.
259 See Kathryn Meier, Delaware Law Issues Update: Unique Conference
Brings Together National, Legal, Corporate, Communities, U. DAILY (Dec. 5, 2013,
12:57 PM), http://www.udel.edu/udaily/2014/dec/delaware-law-issues-120513.html
[http://perma.cc/7SC3-H47E] (quoting Elson as explaining that “Delaware law
preserves national, fair balance”).
260 See R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of
Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5 (1987) (reviewing
circumstances leading to the legislative adoption of DGCL § 102(b)(7)).
261 Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of
Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 855-56 (1993).
262 Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1826 (2002).
263 Romano, supra note 261, at 853.
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for money damages.264 Issuers have the option of exempting a
transaction from the scope of the Delaware antitakeover statute
or waiving its application in advance.265 Similarly, although the
legislature has amended the statute to address issues such as
majority voting,266 proxy access,267 and reimbursement of proxy
expenses,268 in each case the statute is enabling—authorizing but
not mandating—the creation of greater shareholder voting power.
Legislative action to create options for individual issuers to
balance director and shareholder rights is different from
legislative intervention to effect a particular balance of rights—as
the 2015 legislation does.
Robert Jackson, as the second commentator at the
Pomerantz Lecture, explained the 2015 legislation in terms of
federalism. Jackson cited Mark Roe’s work. Roe describes
Delaware as operating within the shadow of the federal
government, which is able to preempt Delaware if members of
Congress, the SEC, or the federal courts are unhappy with the
policy choices reflected in Delaware corporate law.269 Delaware
lawmakers have admitted that the threat of congressional
intervention is a factor that they take into account in structuring
corporate law.270 Roe and others have attributed, in particular,
Delaware’s 2009 legislation authorizing proxy access bylaws as an
effort to forestall the federal adoption of a mandatory proxy access
rule.271 In the same way, Jackson reasoned, federal lawmakers
264 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
265 Id. § 203(b)(3).
266 Id. § 216.
267 Id. § 112.
268 Id. § 113.
269 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003)
(“Delaware’s competition in making corporate law thus comes not . . . primarily[] from other
states, but also from the federal government . . . .”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future
of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal
Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 768 (1987) (arguing that Delaware law
responded to threat of federal minimum standards by becoming more responsive to
shareholder interests); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 923-24 (1982)
(describing ways in which Delaware corporate law shifted from being pro-management to
more shareholder friendly).
270 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Speech, Breaking the Corporate Governance
Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward,
63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1081 (2008) (“When state law appeared to substantial elements of
the investment community to be insufficient to protect investor interests, calls for
congressional action arose, calls that influenced state lawmakers to reexamine the
balance of interests between managers and stockholders.”).
271 See Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its Political
Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012); Lisa M.
Fairfax, Delaware’s New Proxy Access: Much Ado About Nothing?, 11 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. BUS. L. 87, 90 (2009) (citing commentary speculating that Delaware adopted
legislation authorizing proxy access and reimbursement bylaws “not only to confirm or
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might have viewed the ATP decision authorizing fee-shifting
bylaws as too pro-management and responded by preempting
Delaware’s control over shareholder litigation.
Regardless of the degree to which Mark Roe’s
characterization of the threat of federal government motivates
Delaware lawmaking,272 Delaware assuredly had little to fear from
Congress or the Supreme Court in terms of shareholder
litigation rights. Congress previously expressed concern
about excessive shareholder litigation, and it revised federal law
in an effort to limit the potential for litigation abuse.273 The
Supreme Court articulated similar concerns and repeatedly
restricted the scope of shareholder litigation rights.274 In view of
these policy positions, it seems unlikely that federal lawmakers
would have intervened out of a concern that ATP was insufficiently
shareholder-friendly.
This article suggests another possible justification for
the 2015 legislation—the theory of Delaware corporate law
as a package of legislation and ongoing judicial oversight. As I
and others have previously observed, Delaware corporate law is
largely judge-made law.275 The legislative design creates an
affirmative role for judicial lawmaking that is a unique and
valuable supplement to the statute. By mandating that Delaware
corporations retain the right to litigate in the Delaware courts,
with their unique features, the legislature may be viewed as
requiring corporations that wish to avail themselves of Delaware
law to purchase the full package. In other words, a corporation
cannot opt into Delaware law without accepting the Delaware
court’s ability to interpret and mold that law to a specific
transactional context.
otherwise reassert its role as leader in the corporate governance arena, but also to
prevent or curtail further federal encroachment into this area”).
272 Notably, to the extent that Delaware adopted sections 112 and 113 in an
effort to prevent the SEC from adopting a proxy access rule, it was unsuccessful. See
Fisch, Destructive Ambiguity, supra note 15, at 447-52 (describing the SEC’s adoption
and the D.C. Circuit’s subsequent invalidation of Rule 14a-11).
273 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737; Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb).
274 See Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking
Partnership, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 460 (2016) (citing cases reducing the scope of
shareholder litigation because of a concern about litigation abuse).
275 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184, at *38-39 (Del.
Ch. July 13, 2015) (“Historically the judiciary, rather than the General Assembly, has
taken the lead when addressing corporate law issues.”); see also Lawrence Hamermesh,
How We Make Law in Delaware, and What to Expect from Us in the Future, 2 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 409, 409 (2007) (“The best-known of the principal policymakers in Delaware
are the members of the judiciary.”).
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A similar analysis applies to fee shifting. Notably, the
courts’ power over litigation fees allows them to adjust litigation
incentives and, indirectly, to determine the extent of judicial
oversight that is necessary in a particular substantive context.276
Courts can increase fee awards in order to reward plaintiffs’
lawyers for bringing valuable cases and can reduce or eliminate
fee awards to discourage meritless litigation.277 A fee-shifting
bylaw, however, would allow an issuer to usurp judicial discretion
over this calculus. This effect would undermine the courts’ ability
to police the public good aspect of Delaware litigation.278 By
retaining judicial control over the incentive structure of
shareholder litigation, the prohibition on fee shifting, like the
mandate of a Delaware forum, thus preserves the judicial
component of Delaware corporate law.
D. Implications of This Analysis
Understanding the rationale for the Delaware legislation
can help inform the scope of the legislation’s implications for
future governance innovations. In particular, the foregoing
analysis suggests that litigation bylaws are distinctive because of
their potential impact on the lawmaking role of the Delaware
courts. The ban on fee shifting should not be read as a legislative
judgment that fee-shifting bylaws are bad for corporations or
impermissibly interfere with shareholder rights. Similarly, the
2015 legislation does not signal that the legislature is likely to
intervene to prohibit other governance innovations that are
276 See Fisch et al., Peppercorn, supra note 258, at 573-74 (describing judicial
sensitivity to incentive effect of fee awards in merger litigation); Phillip R. Sumpter,
Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of Chancery’s Answer to
Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 675
(2013) (explaining how judges respond to the incentives they provide by “awarding
varying levels of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel”).
277 See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1252 (Del. 2012)
(approving Chancery Court’s award of $300 million fee on the ground that it “creates a
healthy incentive for plaintiff ’s lawyers to actually seek real achievement for the
companies that they represent in derivative actions and the classes that they represent
in class actions” (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiff ’s Petition for
Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses and Rulings of the Court at 85, In re S. Peru
Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 961-CS))); see
also In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136-37 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(surveying fee awards in prior cases relative to the perceived value generated by the
litigation). Presumably the Delaware courts also retain the authority to order fee
shifting in cases of litigation abuse.
278 Significantly, the Delaware courts are particularly well-suited to consider the
broader policy implications of shareholder litigation. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (authorizing courts to “give special consideration to matters of
law and public policy in addition to the corporation’s best interests” in deciding whether to
grant corporation’s motion to dismiss derivative litigation).
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potentially value-decreasing or as an instruction to the courts to
be more aggressive in policing the scope of the new governance.
Rather than being understood in terms of shareholder
power or substantive limits on managerial authority, the
legislation should be viewed as narrowly tailored to preserving
the structure of the statutory scheme that enables firm-specific
innovation constrained by market discipline and judicial
oversight. It is that structure that corporate America appears to
value, as reflected in its choice of Delaware incorporation.
The analysis also has implications in terms of the
potential evolutionary response to the legislation. As the
Delaware Council noted, issuers have the option of responding to
perceived litigation abuse through alternative innovations.
Indeed, shortly after the legislation was adopted, two
commentators published an article advocating a “no fees” bylaw
that would prohibit a court from awarding attorneys’ fees to a
successful plaintiff and require each side instead to bear its
own costs in shareholder litigation.279 As the commentators
correctly observed, a literal reading of the 2015 amendments
would not prohibit such a bylaw.280 Under the reasoning
advanced in this article, however, the proposed bylaw would be
problematic in that it would similarly constrain judicial
discretion by prohibiting courts from incentivizing and
rewarding plaintiffs for bringing cases that the courts view as
socially valuable.
Another potential innovation would require shareholder
collective action to initiate litigation. For example, an issuer
might adopt a bylaw requiring consent by a minimum
percentage of the outstanding shares before a shareholder is
permitted to initiate a derivative suit.281 Such a bylaw might
ensure both that a substantial number of shareholders view
the suit as valuable and that the litigation is not being brought
solely to further the interests of plaintiffs’ counsel.282 This
article argues that courts should not view this bylaw’s
restriction as analogous to fee shifting and that, because it is
279 See Bayliss & Mixon, supra note 230.
280 Id.
281 At least one issuer has adopted such a bylaw. See Alison Frankel, The
Latest in Restrictive Corporate Bylaws: Small Shareholders Can’t Sue, REUTERS (Nov.
13, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/11/13/the-latest-in-restrictive-cor
porate-bylaws-small-shareholders-cant-sue/ [http://perma.cc/UXL4-L6UD] (describing
adoption of such a bylaw by Imperial Holdings).
282 See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 8,
In re Gen-Probe, Inc., S’holder Litig, (No. 7495-VCL) (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/11/gen-probeshareholder-transcript.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M2FV-C2NF] (expressing concern about representative plaintiff who
owned two shares of stock in the company).
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not, the bylaw should be upheld despite the fact that it would
limit the ability of small shareholders to bring suit.
This article’s analysis thus offers guidelines for issuers
in attempting to respond to the Council’s invitation for further
governance innovation to address the potential for litigation
abuse. Delaware’s intervention with respect to litigation
bylaws should not, however, be read more broadly. In
particular, the legislation neither reflects a substantive view
about the appropriate balance of power between shareholder
and director authority nor the appropriate role of bylaws in
structuring that balance. The precise limitations on the new
governance remain unclear, and although future innovation
may require a reexamination of the current legal framework,
the Delaware legislature has, for the moment, preserved the
existing role of the courts in analyzing that framework on a
case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
The new governance challenges the traditional
allocation of power between shareholders and the board of
directors. The extent to which issuer-specific governance
provisions that structure or restructure decisionmaking
authority are permissible remains unclear under Delaware
law. On the one hand, shareholder efforts present the potential
to interfere with the board’s statutory authority to run the
company. On the other hand, board-adopted bylaws can
constrain the shareholder electoral power upon which the
board’s statutory authority is based.
Litigation bylaws offered courts the opportunity to
consider the appropriate balance of authority and the degree to
which individual issuers could adjust this balance. The 2015
legislation eliminated this opportunity by imposing mandatory
restrictions on the permissible scope of litigation bylaws.
Although the legislation is in tension with Delaware’s
traditional approach to governance innovation, it can be
rationalized as preserving the critical component of judicial
lawmaking as part of the package that constitutes Delaware
corporate law. In light of this explanation, the legislation
should not be read as a broader limitation on the scope of the
new governance.
